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In 14 studies, we tested whether political conservatives’ stronger free will beliefs were linked to stronger
and broader tendencies to moralize and, thus, a greater motivation to assign blame. In Study 1
(meta-analysis of 5 studies, n ⫽ 308,499) we show that conservatives have stronger tendencies to
moralize than liberals, even for moralization measures containing zero political content (e.g., moral
badness ratings of faces and personality traits). In Study 2, we show that conservatives report higher free
will belief, and this is statistically mediated by the belief that people should be held morally responsible
for their bad behavior (n ⫽ 14,707). In Study 3, we show that political conservatism is associated with
higher attributions of free will for specific events. Turning to experimental manipulations to test our
hypotheses, we show the following: when conservatives and liberals see an action as equally wrong there
is no difference in free will attributions (Study 4); when conservatives see an action as less wrong than
liberals, they attribute less free will (Study 5); and specific perceptions of wrongness account for the
relation between political ideology and free will attributions (Study 6a and 6b). Finally, we show that
political conservatives and liberals even differentially attribute free will for the same action depending
on who performed it (Studies 7a– d). These results are consistent with our theory that political differences
in free will belief are at least partly explicable by conservatives’ tendency to moralize, which strengthens
motivation to justify blame with stronger belief in free will and personal accountability.
Keywords: free will, morality, blame, motivated cognition, political psychology

Liberals and conservatives characteristically view the relationship between the individual and society in different terms.

Whereas liberal (i.e., left-wing) ideology has often focused on the
role of social institutions and other external forces in shaping
individual behavior, conservative (i.e., right-wing) thinking tends
to emphasize the importance of personal responsibility (Eidelman,
Crandall, Goodman, & Blanchar, 2012; Jost, Nosek, & Gosling,
2008; Skitka, Mullen, Griffin, Hutchinson, & Chamberlin, 2002;
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“We must reject the idea that every time a law’s broken, society is
guilty rather than the lawbreaker. It is time to restore the American
precept that each individual is accountable for his actions.”
—Ronald Reagan (1968)
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Skitka & Tetlock, 1992, 1993). According to the conservative
view, individuals should take responsibility for the course of their
own lives and refrain from expecting others to solve their problems. In addition to being explicitly championed by prominent
conservative leaders (Cameron, 2010; Reagan, 1968; Thatcher,
1981), a focus on personal responsibility seems to pervade the
thinking of everyday conservatives as well (Carey & Paulhus,
2013). Research has shown that conservatives are more likely than
liberals to make dispositional attributions of responsibility in a
number of key areas, including poverty (Zucker & Weiner, 1993),
unemployment (Feather, 1985), obesity (Crandall, 1994), and even
intelligence (Skitka et al., 2002).
In addition to judging that others are more responsible for their
actions, recent research by Carey and Paulhus (2013) has suggested that conservatives also believe that others have more free
will. Political conservatism is not merely associated with thinking
that others are more responsible for their specific actions, but also
with thinking that they have more autonomous control over their
behavior in general. Across three studies, Carey and Paulhus
(2013) found that belief in free will was associated with traditional
conservative attitudes as well as with an increased importance
attached to the three “conservative” moral foundations (loyalty,
authority, and sanctity). Why might this be so?
We suggest that the relationship between political orientation
and free will belief might be parsimoniously explained by motivated social cognition. This hypothesis is derived from two areas
of research. First, recent research has demonstrated that free will
beliefs are motivated by desires to punish others (Clark et al.,
2014) and to justify holding them morally responsible (Clark,
Baumeister, & Ditto, 2017), which recently has been replicated
and confirmed in meta-analyses (Clark, Winegard, & Baumeister,
2019). Second, political conservatives have a tendency to moralize
a wider scope of actions than their liberal counterparts (Graham,
Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Graham et al., 2011, 2013). Combining
these two areas of research, we suggest that conservatives report
greater belief in free will and attribute more free will to people
than do liberals because conservatives recognize a wider spectrum
of transgressions for which moral responsibility must be assigned
and moral blame attributed.

Motivated Beliefs in Free Will
What do we mean by “free will?” In this article, we draw on an
understanding of free will that has both been articulated by philosophers and seems to track the intuitions of lay-people. In line
with previous empirical work in this area, we use the term free will
to refer to an autonomous choice of action that a person performs
in the absence of substantial internal and external constraints
(Baumeister & Monroe, 2014; Paulhus & Carey, 2011), where this
ability to choose renders one morally responsible for their actions
(Nichols, 2007; Nichols & Knobe, 2007). Free will, in other words,
can be understood as responsibility-making autonomy. Note that
the concept of free will is distinct from the concept of attributions
in social psychology (e.g., Skitka et al., 2002; Zucker & Weiner,
1993), and this can broadly be related to the philosophical distinction between reasons and causes. Attributions are reasons, and
help answer the question of what the reason is for why a person
performed a given action. In social psychology, work on attribution has focused on two main kinds of reasons: dispositional

attributions (the person did it because of the kind of person they
are); and situational attributions (the person did it because of the
situation they were placed in). In contrast, the concept of free will
relates to causes, which can partially include reasons but also
ultimate level causal factors (e.g., it was determined by genes). To
illustrate: it is perfectly plausible to say that someone stole something because they are a selfish person (a dispositional attribution),
but that because their selfishness was genetically determined (an
attribution of free will), they did not have free will and, thus, were
not personally responsible.
Assuming this definition of free will of responsibility-making
autonomy, what would it mean for belief in free will to be
“motivated,” as we suggested? Motivated social cognition refers to
the well-documented tendency for desired conclusions to organize
judgment processes in a top-down fashion that favors evidence for
the conclusions people prefer (Ditto, Pizarro, & Tannenbaum,
2009). When reasoning about the world, people often act more like
intuitive lawyers than intuitive scientists, such that their desired
beliefs influence their actual beliefs (Baumeister & Newman,
1994; Haidt, 2001, 2012). In moral reasoning, desires to blame and
to hold individuals morally responsible compel people to produce
rational explanations that would justify their moral judgments
(Alicke, 2000; Clark, Chen, & Ditto, 2015). Indeed, a growing
body of research has demonstrated that the desire to hold individuals morally accountable for their immoral behaviors can lead to
motivated judgments that such immoral behaviors are intended,
under the agent’s control, and freely chosen (Alicke, 1992, 2000;
Alicke, Rose, & Bloom, 2011; Clark et al., 2014; Clark, Bauman,
Kamble, & Knowles, 2017; Clark, Winegard, & Shariff, 2019;
Cushman, Knobe, & Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008; Hamlin & Baron,
2014; Knobe, 2003; Knobe & Fraser, 2008; Leslie, Knobe, &
Cohen, 2006; Phillips & Knobe, 2009).
But how might belief in free will, specifically, be seen as a form
of motivated social cognition? Across five studies, Clark et al.
(2014) used a range of methods— experimental, correlational, and
archival—to test the hypothesis that a key motivation underlying
belief in human free will is the desire to hold others morally
responsible for their behavior. For example, telling students that a
fellow classmate had cheated on a recent exam increased belief in
free will on a standard measure of global free will belief; and
countries with higher homicide rates were also found to express
higher levels of free will belief. Clark et al. (2014) concluded that
free will belief is not an abstract, invariant phenomenon, but is
rather linked, at least in part, to a motivated desire to hold others
morally responsible for their wrongful behaviors, the strength of
which varies across time and situation.
The focus on wrongful behaviors may have a straightforward
explanation. Put simply, across a broad range of psychological
phenomena, “bad is stronger than good” (Baumeister, Bratslavsky,
Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001, p. 1), meaning that people tend to
notice, and give greater weight to, negative actions and outcomes
than positive ones. For example, research has repeatedly shown a
praise-blame asymmetry in judgments of intentional action: people
are more inclined to say that a behavior with negative side effects
was performed intentionally than an identical action with positive
side effects (Knobe, 2003; Pettit & Knobe, 2009). Motivated
judgments of others’ behavior are most pronounced in—and perhaps even driven by— cases in which the behavior is seen as
harmful (Alicke, Buckingham, Zell, & Davis, 2008). All else being
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equal, the desire to blame another for bad behavior is more potent
than the desire to praise another for their good behavior (Clark,
Shniderman, Luguri, Baumeister, & Ditto, 2018). As Baumeister et
al. (2001) note, while a general explanation for this effect is hard
to come by given its inherent generality across a broad range of
psychological phenomena, it is likely that a tendency to pay greater
attention to bad actions and outcomes than good ones will have
been evolutionarily adaptive because survival often requires more
urgent attention to possible bad outcomes (e.g., a predator behind
you) than possible good outcomes (e.g., a berry bush behind you).
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ing the degree to which various groups (e.g., the unemployed, the
homeless, prisoners, women with unwanted pregnancies, etc.) are
responsible for their plights and, thus, how they should be treated
by governmental policies. Moreover, our hypothesized results
might help explain why these kinds of disagreements seem so
intractable. If policy differences result from more affect-based
moral intuitions about responsibility—and liberals and conservatives have different moral intuitions—it may be difficult or impossible for liberals and conservatives to agree on the “correct”
policy solutions. And these disagreements should not be expected
to be solved by collecting more and better data.
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Political Differences in Morality
What could explain a greater belief in free will among conservatives compared with liberals? It is possible that this difference
simply reflects a fundamental underlying political difference in
perceptions of how much freedom and control people have over
their behavior and life outcomes. However, given the work of
Clark et al. (2014) on free will belief being driven by a desire to
blame, we predicted that conservatives’ greater endorsement of
belief in free will might be due—at least in part—to conservatives’
stronger tendency to moralize. According to a large body of
research, political conservatives and liberals differ in many more
ways than their preferred political candidates (Amodio, Jost, Master, & Yee, 2007; Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009), including at the
cognitive level. For the purposes of this article, a growing body of
evidence has demonstrated that political orientations are associated
with differences in judgments in the moral domain, both in terms
of what constitutes a moral issue in the first place as well as how
wrong a particular action or behavior is.
The social intuitionist approach suggests that moral judgment is
largely a motivated phenomenon: moral judgment is triggered by
quick moral intuitions, and moral reasoning largely serves as a post
hoc rationalization of these intuitive judgments (Haidt, 2001).
Moral Foundations Theory (Graham et al., 2011, 2013) is rooted in
work on motivated cognition and the social intuitionist approach to
morality (Baumeister & Newman, 1994; Ditto et al., 2009; Haidt,
2001, 2012) and posits that conservatives have a broader moral
domain than do liberals. In other words, liberals are less inclined
to perceive a variety of actions as morally relevant than conservatives (Graham et al., 2009)—a finding demonstrated by analyzing data drawn from participants from 11 different world regions
(Graham et al., 2011), and from life narrative interviews with
politically engaged adults (McAdams et al., 2008). Similarly, we
note, political conservatism is associated with more punitiveness in
general (e.g., Carroll, Perkowitz, Lurigio, & Weaver, 1987; Sargent, 2004). Therefore, while liberals can and do find some actions
more morally wrong than conservatives (Frimer, Tell, & Motyl,
2017), the available evidence does suggest that conservatives tend
to view a broader range of actions as having moral significance
and, therefore, as more suitable for moral judgment and blame.1
We demonstrate this ourselves in Study 1 of the article, using a
meta-analysis of five new studies with a combined number of
308,499, establishing the conservative tendency to moralize.

Practical Significance
If our hypothesis is correct, this could help explain a variety of
political disagreements between liberals and conservatives regard-

The Present Research
We conducted a series of 14 studies to explore this motivated
cognition account whereby conservatives ascribe more free will
because they have a broader moral domain and, thus, more often
perceive actions as appropriately subject to moral judgment. In
other words, we predicted that because liberals think that a narrower range of phenomena constitute moral issues, they have a
narrower range of actions for which judgments of blame and
attributions of free will are deemed to be appropriate. If this
prediction is correct, (a) higher tendencies to blame should account
for conservatives’ stronger belief in free will, and (b) political
liberals and conservatives should differ in attributions of free will
only when there are corresponding differences in the extent to
which they perceive actions to be morally wrong. In short, we
should find that conservatives believe more in free will and ascribe
more free will generally (Studies 1–3), but in instances where
differences in perceived moral wrongness can be removed or
reversed, differences in free will ascriptions should similarly be
absent or in the opposite direction, respectively (Studies 4 –7).
Experimental materials, preregistrations, data, analysis code, and
results can be seen at the Open Science Framework (OSF; https://
osf.io/ny82c/).

Meta-Analysis of Studies 1a–1e
This opening meta-analysis was conducted to establish the relationship between more conservative political ideology and moralization. We combined data from five studies drawn from a
variety of populations with a total number of 308,499. Each study
included a measure of political ideology and one or more measures
of moralization.

Studies 1a–1e Method
Table 1 contains summary details (sample information, ideology, and moralization measures) for Studies 1a–1e and full details
of all study methods are available at the OSF.
1
While aspects of our argument are adjacent to Moral Foundations
Theory (MFT), we do not depend on the specifics of MFT and will avoid
these arguments in this article. We believe the findings from MFT support
our assertion that conservatives moralize more than liberals, but we do not
rely exclusively on MFT to make this point. We establish this ourselves in
Study 1. Moreover, we take no stance on the kinds or categories of moral
intuitions that liberals or conservatives might have, nor whether these kinds
or categories can all fit under a “harm” umbrella or whether they reflect
distinct moral modules.
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Table 1
Moralization Meta-Analysis Summary and Results
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Study

Sample

Study 1a

yourmorals.org

Study 1b

Measuring
morality
Survey

Study 1c

yourmorals.org

Study 1d
Study 1e

n

Mage

% Male

Ideology measure

Moralization measure

303,553 40.88

55

1,516 46.76

48

7-point very liberal to very
conservative
7-point extremely liberal to extremely
conservative

Moral Foundations
Questionnairea
Moralization of Everyday Life
Scale
Moral Foundations Sacredness
Scalea
Ethical Values Assessmenta
Study 1b overall
Study 1b politically irrelevant
overall
Importance of morally good
characteristics
Moral badness of 16 faces

2,987 38.38

56

MTurk

179 33.95

47

MTurk

264 37.11

38

7-point very liberal to very
conservative
7-point very liberal to very
conservative
7-point extremely liberal to extremely
conservative index on economic
social, foreign policy, and overall

Moral badness of 30
personality facets

Meta-analysis Random effects (all measures)
Results
Random effects (politically irrelevant only)

r

p

0.387 ⬍.0001
0.153 ⬍.0001
0.158 ⬍.0001
0.229 ⬍.0001
0.180 ⬍.0001
0.153 ⬍.0001
0.292 ⬍.0001
0.172

0.026

0.330 ⬍.0001
0.272
0.237

0.003
0.012

Note. MTurk ⫽ Amazon Mechanical Turk.
a
Indicates the moralization measure contains items with political significance. The Politically Irrelevant Results do not include these measures.

Ethics statement. Studies 1a and 1c received ethical approval
from the University of Southern California’s Institutional Review
Board (IRB; “Morality Studies”; UP-07– 00393). Studies 1d and
1e were covered by a separate application from the same institution (“Reading, Thoughts, and Behavior”; UP-12– 00388). In
Study 1b, we conducted secondary data analysis of a publicly
available dataset provided by the “Measuring Morality” project
based at Duke University.
Participants. Studies 1a and 1c were conducted on yourmorals.org, a survey website on which participants (mostly from the
United States, but some from across the globe) complete surveys
in exchange for response feedback. For Study 1b, data were drawn
from the Measuring Morality Survey from a nationally representative panel of adult participants maintained by Knowledge Networks. Studies 1d and 1e were conducted on Amazon Mechanical
Turk (MTurk) with U.S. participants. MTurk is not perfectly
representative of the United States as a whole, but it is diverse with
respect to age, sex, race, education, socioeconomic status (SES),
and ideology—more so than student samples are (Paolacci &
Chandler, 2014).
Ideology. Ideology was self-reported on 7-point scales in all
studies. In Studies 1a, 1c, and 1d, the poles were very liberal to
very conservative. In Study 1b, these were extremely liberal to
extremely conservative. In Study 1e, participants self-reported
their political ideology on economic issues, social issues, foreign
policy issues, and overall on the same scale as Study 1b, which
were combined into an index of ideology.
Moralization. While we used a number of different moralization measures, some can be criticized for containing politically
relevant items (e.g., religious items), and so the meta-analysis was
conducted twice, once with all moralization measures, and once
with the politically irrelevant measures only. The measures that
were excluded in the politically irrelevant version of the metaanalysis have an asterisk by their name in the descriptions below
and in Table 1.

In Study 1a, moralization was measured using The Moral Foundations Questionnaireⴱ (MFQ; Graham et al., 2009). Study 1b
included three moralization measures: (a) The Moralization of
Everyday Life Scale (MELS; Lovett, Jordan, & Wiltermuth,
2012), (b) The Moral Foundations Sacredness Scaleⴱ (MFSS;
Graham & Haidt, 2012), and (c) The Ethical Values Assessmentⴱ
(EVA; Padilla-Walker & Jensen, 2016).
In Study 1c, moralization was measured by having participants
evaluate how important it was for a person to possess various
characteristics in order to be a morally good person. Participants
completed a random subset of 45– 47 characteristics from a list of
92. This list was created by combining previous studies that
attempted to create representative lists of moralized characteristics
(Aquino & Reed, 2002; Cawley, Martin, & Johnson, 2000; Lapsley & Lasky, 2001; K. D. Smith, Smith, & Christopher, 2007;
Walker & Pitts, 1998) and conducting a large scale pretest in
which 4,565 yourmorals.org participants were asked to report (a)
their most important moral values and (b) behaviors for which they
most often morally judged people.
Study 1d measured moralization by having participants view 16
pictures of faces and rate how morally bad the depicted person
probably was. The 16 pictures were taken from a larger set of
pictures shown to effectively capture four main quadrants of social
perception (e.g., Harris & Fiske, 2006): Warmth/Incompetence;
Coldness/Incompetence; Coldness/Competence; Warmth/Competence. Study 1e measured moralization by having participants rate
how morally bad 30 personality traits are. These 30 traits were the
individual personality facets from the NEO PI-R (Costa & McCrae, 1992a, 1992b).

Meta-Analysis Method
We used many of the suggested procedures outlined by Goh,
Hall, and Rosenthal (2016) to conduct our meta-analysis. Because
the studies were drawn from different populations and used dif-
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ferent measures of moralization, we report random effects (Goh et
al., 2016; see also Hedges & Vevea, 1998).We included one effect
size for each study (i.e., the effect sizes for the three moralization
measures in Study 1b were averaged; Card, 2012); thus, five r
effect sizes (the correlations between more conservative ideology
and higher moralization) were included. We conducted one-sample
t tests of the effect sizes first with all moralization measures and
then with the potentially politically confounded ones removed.
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Results
As can be seen in summary Table 1, more conservative political
ideology was positively and significantly related to greater moralization in every single study (ps ⬍ .027), including those containing zero political content. The meta-analysis revealed a small
to medium effect size overall, r ⫽ .27, p ⫽ .003; which remained
small to medium and significant with the politically irrelevant
measures only, r ⫽ .24, p ⫽ .012.

Discussion
This meta-analysis adds to the body of research demonstrating
that conservatives have stronger tendencies to moralize than liberals. This was true overall, and crucially, was true even for
moralization measures containing zero political content (e.g.,
moral badness ratings of faces and personality traits). Thus, these
results support a premise of our present hypothesis and justifies
our examination of whether conservative moralization may explain—in part— conservatives’ stronger beliefs in free will and
personal responsibility.

Study 2
Study 2 used individual difference measures to examine the
relationships among political ideology, free will belief, and moralization. We conducted a preliminary test of our hypothesis by
assessing whether tendencies to hold others morally responsible
for blameworthy actions mediate the relationship between conservative ideology and belief in free will. The Free Will and Determinism Scale-Plus (FAD-Plus; Paulhus & Carey, 2011) is probably the most widely used free will belief scale, but it is routinely
criticized for confounding free will and moral responsibility for
blameworthy actions (Clark et al., 2014; Clark, Winegard, &
Baumeister, 2019; Monroe & Ysidron, 2019). Items such as
“Criminals are totally responsible for the bad things they do” and
“People must take full responsibility for any bad choices they
make” measure beliefs about how blameworthy people generally
are for bad actions more than beliefs about freedom and control.
Other items, however, exhibit higher prima facie validity, such as
“People have complete control over the decisions they make” and
“Strength of mind can always overcome the body’s desires.” We
did not have access to large scale data with the modern FAD-Plus,
but we did have access to large scale data with the original FAD
(Paulhus & Margesson, 1994), which is identical on five of the
seven items and similarly contains four face valid items and three
general blame items. We decided to leverage the flaws of this scale
to examine whether tendencies to blame (using the blameworthy
scale items) statistically mediate the relationship between conservative political ideology and free will belief (using the face valid
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items).2 There are two limitations to this approach. First, the FAD
items were likely selected by scale developers to intercorrelate and
this weakens their appropriateness for mediation analysis. Second,
causal orders cannot be inferred from mediation analyses of this
sort (see our later studies, which experimentally test whether
manipulating moral blame motives influence free will judgments,
for such causal evidence). Nevertheless, this analysis is at least
suggestive that a proportion of the relationship between more
conservative political ideology and free will beliefs can be linked
to general blame tendencies.

Method
Participants (n ⫽ 14,708; 38% female; Mage ⫽ 34.80, SD ⫽
15.88; 73% from the United States, the remaining from more than
100 countries) were recruited through yourmorals.org. This study
received ethical approval from the IRB of University of California
Irvine (“Moral Psychology on the Internet”; Protocol #2007–
5740). Demographic information is collected at registration including age, sex, education, religious attendance, and political orientation. After registration, visitors self-select to take one or more
surveys from a list of over 50. For inclusion, participants had to
have completed the free will subscale from the Free Will and
Determinism scale (FAD; Paulhus & Margesson, 1994), which
was broken down into one free will belief subscale (␣ ⫽ .69)
containing four items (e.g., “People have complete control over the
decisions they make.”) and one blame subscale (␣ ⫽ .71) containing three items (e.g., “Criminals are totally responsible for the bad
things they do.”), each rated on a 5-point scale from strongly
disagree to strongly agree. All participants who completed the
FAD were included if they also reported their political ideology on
a 7-point scale from extremely liberal to extremely conservative.
The sample leaned liberal (M ⫽ 2.99, SD ⫽ 1.69), with 66.4%
below the moderate midpoint, 13.8% at the moderate midpoint,
and 19.7% above the moderate midpoint.

Results
More conservative ideology was positively correlated with free
will belief, r ⫽ .351, p ⬍ .001, and blame tendencies, r ⫽ .427,
p ⬍ .001, and free will belief and blame tendencies were positively
correlated, r ⫽ .527, p ⬍ .001. We conducted two bootstrap
mediation analyses (10,000 resamples) testing whether blame tendencies statistically mediated the relationship between ideology
and free will beliefs both with and without demographic controls
(age, sex, education, and religious attendance). Both mediations
were highly significant, without controls (see Figure 1), b ⫽ .100,
SE ⫽ .002, 95% confidence interval (CI) [.095, .104], Z ⫽ 41.52,
p ⬍ .0001, and with all controls, b ⫽ .097, SE ⫽ .003, 95% CI
[.090, .103], Z ⫽ 29.15, p ⬍ .0001 (being younger, female, less
educated, and more religious all significantly predicted stronger
free will belief; being older, female, and less educated significantly
predicted stronger blame tendencies [religiosity did not significantly predict blame tendencies]).
2
We have not conducted any analyses on the individual items of the
FAD here, but our data are openly available for any researchers interested
in this.
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Blameworthiness

B = 0.22, SE = .004 ***

Political
Conservatism

B = 0.46, SE = .008 ***

B = 0.08, SE = .004 ***
(B = 0.18, SE = .004 ***)

Free Will
Belief
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Figure 1. Indirect effect of more conservative political ideology on free
will belief through blame in Study 2. ⴱⴱⴱ p ⬍ .001.

Discussion
Study 2 provided individual difference evidence consistent with
our hypothesis. Stronger beliefs that people are morally responsible for their bad behaviors statistically mediated the relationship
between more conservative ideology and stronger beliefs in free
will— both with and without relevant demographic controls. This
suggests that higher tendencies to blame account for a proportion
of the relationship between more conservative political ideology
and free will beliefs. Of course, correlational studies cannot supply
evidence of causal relationships and so our later studies manipulate
blame desires directly to test how these differentially impact the
free will judgments of conservatives and liberals.

Study 3
In Study 1 we have demonstrated that conservatives moralize a
much broader range of actions than liberals, and in Study 2 that
conservatives report higher general belief in free will, and that this
association of ideology with free will belief is partially mediated
by beliefs that others are morally responsible for their bad actions.
In Study 3 we wanted to turn away from reports of general,
abstract belief in free will to look at attributions of free will for
specific events, using the opportunity to look at attributions of free
will for both positive and negative events.
To our knowledge, no research has been conducted on a comparison of political differences in attributions of free will for
positive events. This is surprising, though, because the comparison
between attributions for positive and negative events sets up an
interesting test of two alternative explanations for what may be
driving the existing liberal-conservative differences in endorsement of free will. If conservatives are dispositionally inclined to
hold a stronger belief that people have free will than liberals, then
conservatives should endorse and attribute greater free will regardless of whether their actions lead to good or bad outcomes.
However, if differences in free will belief are in part motivated by
moral judgments of wrongness and a desire to blame, then we
should see an interaction between political affiliation and the
positivity or negativity of the event. Because conservatives have
stronger tendencies to moralize, they should show a stronger
negativity bias in their free will attributions—that is, attributing
more free will to actions with negative rather than positive outcomes—than would liberals. In Study 3, we test this.

Method
Open Science and ethics statement. Our design, hypotheses,
and analysis plan were all preregistered at the OSF. For this study

and all subsequent ones, we report all measures, manipulations,
and exclusions, and results, analysis code, and experiment materials are available for download at: https://osf.io/ny82c/. This study
received ethical approval from the IRB of the University of British
Columbia (“Social Impacts of Emerging Technology”; Protocol
#H18-02727).
Participants. We originally recruited 146 American participants online using MTurk. On the recommendation of an anonymous reviewer and editor, we subsequently conducted a preregistered second wave of data collection to maximize power. We
report in the main text results using the original sample combined
with the new one, which gave us a final sample of 444 participants
(188 female, Mage ⫽ 35). On average, participants were slightly
left-of-center on a 1–7 scale (M ⫽ 3.89, SD ⫽ 1.65), with 188
Democrats and 131 Republicans (the remaining were neither).
Design. We had a fully within-subjects design, where participants were asked to rate how much free will someone had for six
distinct situations. Three of these were negative (the material
living conditions of the homeless, drug addicts’ addictions, a man
imprisoned for participating in gang violence) and three were
positive (the financial success of investment bankers, students’
admission to elite universities, a famous musician winning a
Grammy award). These items were selected simply because they
appeared to be unambiguously positive or negative, but later
studies more systematically pretest the selected target actions. For
each item, participants rated how much (a) responsibility (1 ⫽ not
at all personally responsible to 7 ⫽ completely personally responsible); (b) control (1 ⫽ not at all in control; 7 ⫽ completely in
control); and (c) free will (1 ⫽ no free will at all; 7 ⫽ complete
free will) the different groups or individuals concerned had for
their current situation.3 These scores were aggregated to form a
reliable overall measure of free will attributions for both positive
(␣ ⫽ .83) and negative situations (␣ ⫽ .82).
Analysis. We collected and analyzed one wave of data before
our initial submission for publication. At the request of a reviewer
and our editor, we then conducted another wave of data collection
before completing the final analyses. To account for this sequential
testing and ensure full transparency, we have taken three approaches. First, we have simply reported the results in full for the
original sample in the supplemental results at the OSF. Second, we
have used the technique of adjusting our significance levels for
sequential testing. Following the guide provided by Lakens (2014),
we have used a linear alpha spending technique to obtain a revised
significance level of p ⱕ .038 that accounts for the sequential
testing. While an increasingly common technique in social psychology that easily allows the reader to see whether our key result
is significant at this revised level, the strategy is formally inappropriate—though still acceptable— because we did not prespecify
that we would conduct two waves of data collection and analysis.
Given this, the third strategy we have used is to compute a
3
A reviewer questioned the appropriateness of a responsibility question
in our index of free will attributions. Here, we are precisely interested in
motivated increases in free will attributions for purposes of increased
personal responsibility, so it seemed appropriate for the question at hand.
However, we also cross-checked our main results removing this responsibility item, and this did not impact the statistical significance of any of our
main results. Thus, even removing this item, the interpretation of our data
remains unchanged.
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p-augmented statistic (Sagarin, Ambler, & Lee, 2014), a technique
explicitly designed for cases where the sample size has been
increased post hoc after initial data analysis. This statistic consists
of a range of values greater than p ⱕ .05 and represents the
magnitude of the resulting Type I error inflation as a result of our
increased data collection.

SE ⫽ .03, t ⫽ 11.24, p ⬍ .001, 95% CI [.24, .35], R2 ⫽ 0.22,
semipartial r ⫽ .47, than for positive events, b ⫽ .23, SE ⫽ .03,
t ⫽ 8.78, p ⬍ .001, 95% CI [.18, .28], R2 ⫽ 0.15, semipartial r ⫽
.39 (see Figure 2).

Results

In Study 3 we looked at whether political ideology was associated with attributions of free will for specific events. We found that
political ideology indeed predicted higher free will attributions
overall, and this relationship appeared stronger for negative situations than positive ones (though, contra our preregistered hypothesis, the political difference was only reduced—rather than absent
entirely—among positive situations). Conceptually, the capacity
for free will should hold whether one experiences a good or bad
outcome, and so if ideology is genuinely related to an abstract
belief in free will, there should have been no difference depending
on the valence of the outcomes. That we observed a small-butsignificant interaction whereby conservatism predicted higher attributions of free will to a stronger degree for the negative than the
positive events, however, suggests that free will attributions are
not merely reflecting some dispositional variance in a belief in
human autonomy, but instead a more basic, social psychological
phenomenon—likely one relating to blame.
One important limitation of this study, though, is that we did not
control for perceptions of wrongness of the events. We assume that
Republicans attributed more free will to the negative events—
being homeless, being a drug addict, and being imprisoned for
gang violence— because these are all situations that conservatives
tend to find more morally objectionable than do liberals (e.g.,
Graham et al., 2009). If free will judgments only differ by political
ideology when there are differences in perceived moral wrongness,
then these differences should be eliminated when the perceived
wrongness of the event is matched for both conservatives and
liberals.

We used regression to look at whether political orientation
(continuous between-subjects) predicted free will attributions, and
whether this differed for the positive and negative events (as a
within-subjects variable, ⫺1 ⫽ negative, 1 ⫽ positive). In this and
all subsequent studies, we report semipartial rs (the proportion of
the variance in free will attributions uniquely explained by the
indicated predictor) as estimates of effect sizes (except for the
mixed within-between interaction here, for which the semi partial
r is not available).
Results using the full sample revealed a significant interaction
between valence condition and political ideology, b ⫽ ⫺.03, SE ⫽
.01, t ⫽ ⫺2.16, p ⫽ .031, 95% CI [⫺.06, .00], Pseudo-R2 ⫽ 0.49,
paugmented ⫽ [.053, .073]. Though a small effect, as can be seen in
see Figure 2, this interaction was significant even at our lower
threshold of significance, p ⬍ .038, accounting for the sequential
data collection (Lakens, 2014). This interaction supplemented a
main effect of ideology whereby conservative ideology was associated with greater free will attributions overall, b ⫽ .26, SE ⫽ .02,
t ⫽ 12.06, p ⬍ .001, 95% CI [.22, .31], and no overall difference
in attributions of free will for the positive or negative events,
b ⫽ ⫺.02, SE ⫽ .03, t ⫽ 0.58, p ⫽ .56, 95% CI [⫺.04, .07].
Specifically, the relationship between conservative ideology and
attributions of free will was stronger for negative events, b ⫽ .30,

Discussion

Study 4

Figure 2. Attributions of free will as a function of participant political
ideology, for positive and negative events separately (Study 3). See the
online article for the color version of this figure.

Study 4 sought to further chart the boundaries of the association
between free will and political ideology by looking at attributions
of free will for specific events that were pretested to be equally
immoral for liberals and conservatives. If political differences in
free will belief are mainly derived from differences in moralizing,
these free will differences should be eliminated when looking at
items judged as equally wrong by both liberals and conservatives.
On the other hand, if political ideology is more abstractly and
generally related to free will belief, then conservatism should be
associated with higher free will attributions across different events,
even those that are judged as equally wrong by both liberals and
conservatives.
While most prior work has focused on attributions for morally
negative events only (see Study 3), we wanted to look at free will
attributions for a range of both moral and nonmoral, and positive
and negative events to test the generality of our hypothesis. If our
hypothesis that political ideology is related to free will belief
because of differences in the scope of the moral domain is correct,
we should observe roughly equivalent attributions of free will
between liberals and conservatives for any type of action that has
roughly equal moral significance for liberals and conservatives.
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Method
Pretesting. We pretested items for use in Study 4 that did not
significantly differ in perceived morality (or valence) based on
political orientation. To do this, we recruited 109 MTurk participants (34 female, Mage ⫽ 36), though five participants were
excluded for failing two attention checks (e.g., “Please click Scale
Point 1 to confirm you’re paying attention”), leaving 104 participants in the analysis. On a 1–7 scale (7 indicating stronger conservatism), participants were on average slightly left-of-center
(M ⫽ 3.53), with slightly liberal views on social issues (M ⫽ 3.19)
and moderate views on economic issues (M ⫽ 3.88). All main
political positions were represented, with 21 Republicans, 39
Democrats, and 43 Independents.
Participants were required to rate a series of 51 events and
occurrences, (a) for how positive or negative it was (⫺100 ⫽
negative; 0 ⫽ neutral; 100 ⫽ positive); and (b) for how moral it
was: is the action morally bad, morally good, or irrelevant to
morality? (⫺100 ⫽ morally bad; 0 ⫽ morally irrelevant; 100 ⫽
morally positive). All of these items were devised by the researchers to be as politically neutral as possible, including a range of both
positive and negative items, and moral and nonmoral items. The
list of all items, along with mean scores and correlations with
ideology, can be seen on the OSF. To select the final items to use
for the main study we used a statistical cut-off point (r ⬍ .10, p ⬎
.40) to ensure conservatives and liberals did not rate the item as
differentially positive or negative, or differentially morally relevant or not. Based on this, we selected 20 items: five that were
moral and positive; five that were moral and negative; five that
were nonmoral and positive; and five that were nonmoral and
negative.
Open Science and ethics statement. For the main study, we
report all measures, manipulations, and exclusions. Results, analysis code, and experiment materials are available for download at
the OSF. This study received ethical approval from the IRB of the
University of Oregon (“The Effect of Culture on Attitudes and
Outcomes”; Protocol #10162012.023).
Participants. For the main study, 647 American participants
completed the survey online using MTurk. Eighteen participants
were excluded from analysis for taking the survey more than once,
leaving a final sample of 629 participants (269 female; Mage ⫽ 35).
Our sample size was determined by available funds and a goal to
recruit at least 150 participants per each of the four conditions.
Design. Our experimental design had a 2 (morality: morally
relevant vs. nonmoral) ⫻ 2 (valence: positive vs. negative) experimental design, where in each condition participants were given
the five events obtained from pretesting and asked to indicate how
much free will they perceived the actor to have. Some participants
read events that were— equally to liberal and conservatives—seen
as positive and morally relevant (e.g., “Working one day a week at
a soup kitchen”); others read events that were negative and morally
relevant (e.g., “Spreading malicious rumors about a co-worker”);
others read events that were positive but nonmoral (e.g., “Making
money from a smart investment”); and the remaining participants
read events that were negative but nonmoral (e.g., “Failing a
college exam”). Full items can be seen on the OSF. The order of
the events and the five dependent variables for each event were all
randomized for each participant to avoid potential order effects.

Measures. For each of the five events, participants rated the
degree of free will that they perceived the actor to have using five
items: “How much control would someone have over __”; “How
much responsibility would someone have for __”; “To what extent
would someone who did __ have exercised free will?”; “To what
extent is someone who __ performing an action that is freely
chosen?”; “To what extent would someone who did __ have been
able to have made other choices and not done this?” rated on
7-point scales from not at all to very much. Within each condition
these five items showed high internal consistency (␣s ⬎ .88) and
so were aggregated together to form an overall measure of free will
attributions (i.e., all five DVs for all five items).
Participants indicated their political ideology on two scales: one
measuring social conservatism, and one measuring economic conservatism, rated on 7-point scales from very liberal to very conservative, which were combined into an index of overall political
ideology (␣ ⫽ .73). Finally, participants completed the free will
subscale of the FAD⫹.

Results
First, we looked at the potential interactive effect of political
orientation with attributions of free will for events that were either
positive or negative, and either morally relevant or nonmoral. We
used a regression-based procedure to examine the effects of morality (⫺1 ⫽ nonmoral, 1 ⫽ morally relevant), valence (⫺1 ⫽
positive, 1 ⫽ negative), and participant political orientation (centered) on attributions of free will. As expected, there was no main
effect of political ideology on ascriptions of free will, b ⫽ .00,
SE ⫽ .02, t ⫽ ⫺0.09, p ⫽ .93, 95% CI [⫺.04, .03], semipartial
r ⫽ ⫺.00. Moreover, there was no three-way interaction of morality, valence, and political orientation, b ⫽ ⫺.03, SE ⫽ .02,
t ⫽ ⫺1.63, p ⫽ .10, 95% CI [⫺.07, .01], R2 ⫽ 0.28, semipartial
r ⫽ ⫺.06, and no interaction of political orientation with whether
the event was moral or nonmoral, b ⫽ ⫺.03, SE ⫽ .02, t ⫽ ⫺1.51,
p ⫽ .13, 95% CI [⫺.06, .01], semipartial r ⫽ ⫺.05, or of political
orientation with whether the event was positive or negative, b ⫽
.01, SE ⫽ .02, t ⫽ 0.59, p ⫽ .55, 95% CI [⫺.02, .05], semipartial
r ⫽ .02. That is, for these items that we had pretested to be equally
matched in morality (and valence) for liberals and conservatives,
there was no effect of political ideology on specific free will
attributions. Indeed, for the 10 items pretested to be equally
morally relevant to liberals and conservatives, there was not a
single significant correlation between political orientation and free
will attributions. This was despite replicating our finding from
Study 2 (and previous work by Carey & Paulhus, 2013), that
conservative political ideology was significantly positively correlated with scores on the free will subscale of the FAD⫹, r ⫽ .29,
p ⬍ .001, with conservatives showing higher endorsement of both
the more abstract, r ⫽ .24, p ⬍ .001 and moral responsibility
focused, r ⫽ .28, p ⬍ .001 items of the scale. Scores on the FAD⫹
were significantly correlated with free will attributions across the
events, r ⫽ .39, p ⬍ .001.
In other words, even though conservatives consistently report
stronger beliefs in free will than liberals, and stronger beliefs in
free will are associated with stronger attributions of free will in
general, conservatives do not attribute more free will than liberals
to actions that they perceive as equally as morally wrong as
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liberals. Thus, when the moral relevance of actions is controlled
for, political differences in free will attributions are eliminated.
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Discussion
In Study 4 we explored whether we might be able to “break” the
association of political ideology and free will by looking at actions
judged to be morally equivalent between liberals and conservatives. If political ideology is related to free will belief primarily
because of differences in the scope of the moral domain, we
reasoned, these differences should be markedly reduced when
looking at items judged as equally wrong by both liberals and
conservatives. Indeed, we found the differences were eliminated
altogether: though we again replicated that conservative ideology
was significantly positively associated with an abstract agreement
that humans have free will, there were no differences in specific
attributions of free will for actions that were pretested to be equally
morally valenced for liberals and conservatives. These results are
consistent with our hypothesis that differences in conservatives’
and liberals’ perceptions of free will may be partially due to
differences in moralization, rather than representing any generalized, abstract belief that human behaviors are freely chosen.
One potential concern with Study 4, however, is that we predicted (and found) a null effect. Our findings are consistent with
the idea that differences in conservatives’ and liberals’ perceptions
of free will are partially due to differences in moralization, and
inconsistent with the idea that conservatives attribute more free
will regardless of the moral content. Nonetheless, because it is
impossible to prove a null hypothesis by rejecting it, we cannot
make firm conclusions about the motivated basis of free will on the
basis of such a null finding. In Study 5, then, we aimed to conduct
a stronger test of our hypothesis by looking at whether the association of conservatism with greater free will could be reversed,
not just eliminated.

Study 5
If the typical tendency for conservatives to endorse stronger
beliefs in free will is because of a motivation to blame, rather than
a stable personality characteristic, this tendency ought to reverse
when confronted with behaviors that conservatives perceive as less
morally wrong than their liberal counterparts. We tested this prediction in Study 5.

Method
Pretesting. We first pretested for items that political conservatives would see as less morally wrong than liberals. American
MTurk participants (n ⫽ 100; 44 female, Mage ⫽ 32) rated how
liberal or conservative they were on a 1–7 scale, with participants
being slightly liberal on average (M ⫽ 3.44), with slightly more
liberal views on social issues (M ⫽ 3.07) and more moderate views
on economic issues (M ⫽ 3.80). All main political parties were
represented, with 13 Republicans, 47 Democrats, and 36 Independents. To help select our items for the main study, participants
rated the moral wrongness of a series of 25 events and behaviors
that were devised by the research team to specifically cover things
that liberals typically are more morally concerned about than
conservatives (e.g., animal welfare, recycling, prejudiced behav-
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ior; Graham et al., 2009). The list of all items, along with mean
scores and correlations with ideology, can be seen on the OSF.
From participants’ ratings, we selected five items based on both
the strength of correlation between political ideology and wrongness (all ps ⬍ .05; all rs ⬎ .22), and the mean wrongness (to avoid
ceiling or floor effects: Ms between 3.62 and 4.95 on a 1–7 scale).
It is illuminating to note that, for 10 out of the 25 items, there were
no significant correlations of political orientation with ratings of
wrongness. In other words, even when we intentionally created
items to capture things that liberals, but not conservatives, are
typically outraged by, conservatives judged 40% of the items as
equally wrong as liberals did.
Open Science and ethics statement. For the main study, we
report all measures, manipulations, and exclusions. Results, analysis code, and experiment materials are available for download
from the OSF. This study received ethical approval from the IRB
of the University of Oregon (“The Effect of Culture on Attitudes
and Outcomes”; Protocol #10162012.023).
Participants. For the main study, 513 American participants
completed the survey online via MTurk.4 Participants were excluded from data analysis if they took the survey more than once
(n ⫽ 5) or failed one or both of two simple checks in which they
had to select a certain scale-point in the FAD⫹, and then indicate
at the end of the survey which event they did not answer questions
about (n ⫽ 36). This left a final sample of 472 participants (237
female; Mage ⫽ 37 years). As in Study 3, we used the same
combination of sequential testing (Lakens, 2014) and a paugmented
statistic (Sagarin et al., 2014) to account for the two stages of data
collection and analysis.
Design. In the main study, participants were given a list of
five events that pretesting revealed would be perceived as more
wrong by liberals: (a) “Robert sends a formal complaint to his
child’s school after finding that his child’s kindergarten teacher is
transgendered”; (b) “Sarah uses make-up products that are tested
on animals”; (c) “In conversation with a fellow student, John finds
out that the student is gay. John immediately tells the student that
he will pray for him”; (d) “Garrett manages an upscale members
club where only young and attractive women are employed”; and
(e) “Riley is remotely piloting military drones above Afghanistan.
She has been ordered to target a compound believed to hold
terrorists, but she knows there may also be civilians. A few hours
after she pilots her drone to attack the compound, she finds out that
8 suspected terrorists and 5 children died in the resulting explosion.”
Each of the five events were presented in randomized order.
Participants rated how much free will, responsibility, control, and
free choice the actor had, and these four items were aggregated to
4
We originally recruited 204 participants and analyzed the results (after
exclusions, n ⫽ 193), and our results were not statistically significant. To
explore whether this outcome was because of any problems with the
specific items, we decided to run another pilot study. However, when
attempting to conduct this pilot, a technical error resulted in recruitment of
275 more participants for the present study instead of the new pilot. We
then re-analyzed the data with the updated sample and found statistically
significant results supporting our hypotheses, suggesting that the nonsignificant effects in the initial analysis were explained by a lack of power. In
the interest of full transparency, we report both sets of results in full at the
OSF, and then use the same combination of sequential testing and the
paugmented statistic to account for our waves of data collection.
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form a measure of free will attributions, as for Study 3 (␣ ⫽ .85).
Participants also rated how wrong they perceived the described
action to be on a 1–7 scale from not at all wrong to very wrong.
Last, participants again completed the free will subscale of the
FAD⫹ and reported their political ideology on the same two
7-point economic and social conservatism used in previous studies.
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Results

originally intended, indicating a smaller effect size for the relationship between perceived moral wrongness and free will attributions for political liberals than for political conservatives. Although we had not predicted this outcome in advance, it seems
consistent with our theoretical framework that liberals’ motivated
free will judgments would be weaker than conservatives’ due to
their relatively weaker tendency to perceive actions as morally
significant. While it would be surprising if liberals did not exhibit
any motivated social cognition whatsoever (i.e., if they did not
attribute more free will to actions they perceived as wrong; Ditto,
Clark, et al., 2019; Ditto, Liu, et al., 2019), it would be equally
surprising if this tendency were equally as strong as it is for
conservatives given the generally weaker tendencies to moralize
among liberals. A tempered or weaker effect, then, might be
expected for liberals.

Supporting our hypothesis, for actions in which political liberals
were more motivated to assign blame (correlation of rated wrongness with ideology: r ⫽ ⫺.47, p ⬍ .001), conservative political
ideology (mean-centered) negatively predicted free will, b ⫽ ⫺.05,
SE ⫽ .02, t ⫽ ⫺2.73, p ⫽ .007, 95% CI [⫺.09, ⫺.02], R2 ⫽ 0.02,
semipartial r ⫽ ⫺.12, paugmented ⫽ [.053, .054]. This interaction
was significant even at our lower threshold of significance, p ⬍
.036, accounting for the sequential data collection (Lakens, 2014).
That is, for these actions that political liberals saw as more wrong,
it was political liberalism that predicted greater free will attributions. This was despite political conservativism again being significantly positively correlated with scores on the free will subscale of the FAD⫹, r ⫽ .19, p ⬍ .001, with conservatives showing
higher endorsement of both the more abstract, r ⫽ .16, p ⬍ .001
and moral responsibility focused, r ⫽ .19, p ⬍ .001 items of the
scale. That is, whereas political conservatives again reported
higher general, abstract belief in free will, when it came to attributing free will for specific events that conservatives found less
morally wrong than liberals, conservatives attributed less free will.
Supporting the idea that differences in moralization underpin the
specific free will attributions, we found that when adding perceived moral wrongness (mean-centered) to the model, political
ideology no longer predicted ascriptions of free will, b ⫽ ⫺.03,
SE ⫽ .02, t ⫽ ⫺1.18, p ⫽ .24, 95% CI [⫺.07, .02], semipartial r ⫽
.05, with only reported moral wrongness significantly predicting
free will attributions, b ⫽ .08, SE ⫽ .03, t ⫽ 2.61, p ⫽ .009, 95%
CI [.02, .13], semipartial r ⫽ .12—thus, implicating wrongness as
the factor driving the relationship between free will and political
ideology, at least in part. Finally, we conducted a mediation
analysis (10,000 resamples) which revealed that wrongness judgments significantly statistically mediated the relationship between
political ideology and attributions of free will, b ⫽ ⫺.03, SE ⫽
.01, 95% CI [⫺.05, ⫺0.01], Z ⫽ ⫺2.55, p ⫽ .011.

Thus far we have shown that conservatives moralize a wide
variety of events more than liberals (Study 1), and while they
generally report greater free will beliefs than do liberals (Studies
2–5), this tendency may be in part motivated by a greater desire to
blame since conservatives show no difference in free will attributions for actions seen as equally wrong as liberals there is no
difference in free will attributions (Study 4), and show lower free
will attributions for actions they find less wrong than liberals
(Study 5). What we have not shown yet, though, is whether (a)
conservatives would attribute more free will for events that they
found more morally wrong than liberals; and (b) whether judgments of moral wrongness for specific actions would mediate the
relationship between conservative political orientation and free
will attributions.
In Study 6, therefore, we built upon the body of evidence from
Studies 2–5 to look at attributions of free will both for events that
conservatives find more wrong, and for politically neutral events in
which there is no difference between conservatives and liberals’
perceptions of wrongness. Our prediction was that conservatives
would only attribute more free will for the events they found
morally wrong, and that this relationship between conservative
ideology and free will attributions would be statistically mediated
by how wrong participants judged the behavior to be. We test this
in two separate studies: an initial test (Study 6a), and then a later,
preregistered replication with a larger sample size (Study 6b).

Discussion

Method

The results of Studies 4 and 5 suggest that the conservative
tendency to ascribe more free will than liberals does not (just)
reflect a stable personality trait, but rather corresponds to the
perceived moral wrongness of actions. While conservatives consistently report higher general, abstract belief in free will as measured by the FAD⫹, a different pattern emerges when it comes to
judgments of free will for specific events. For events that liberals
and conservatives were shown to see as equally morally wrong or
praiseworthy, conservatives and liberals attributed the same degree
of free will (Study 4), and for events that liberals see as more
morally wrong than conservatives, it was liberals that attributed
more free will (Study 5).
For Study 5, we wish to emphasize that these results only
reached statistical significance when using a larger sample than

Pretesting. As in the previous studies, we pretested items for
use in Study 6. Here, however, we sought to identify items that
either did or did not differ in perceived wrongness as a function of
political orientation. American participants on MTurk (n ⫽ 110;
44 female, Mage ⫽ 34) rated how liberal or conservative they were
on a 1–7 scale. Participants were again slightly liberal on average
(M ⫽ 3.30), with more liberal views on social issues (M ⫽ 2.95)
and slightly more moderate views on economic issues (M ⫽ 3.65).
All main political parties were represented, with 22 Republicans,
42 Democrats, and 40 Independents. Participants were then required to rate a series of 38 events and occurrences for how
morally wrong they perceived them to be.
To obtain politically neutral events, most of the items were
drawn from the 30-item Moralization of Everyday Life Scale

Study 6
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(MELS; Lovett et al., 2012). This consists of 30 common and
everyday moral violations, the vast majority of which lack any
clear connection to political ideology (e.g., “Ava parks in a handicapped zone even though she is not handicapped” or “Joseph
starts smoking a cigarette in a non-smoking section of a restaurant”). We primarily drew from the MELS to obtain the politically
neutral items to reduce any unconscious bias that could exist when
creating items. To obtain items that conservatives would judge as
more wrong, we included eight additional items that we devised
ourselves to parallel the format of the MELS items, but with
content that we assumed would be judged differently by conservatives and liberals (e.g., “Doug pretends to be ill to avoid being
sent to war”).
To select the five “politically neutral” items on which conservatives and liberals did not differ in judgments of wrongness, we
used the same statistical cut-off point as in Study 4 (r ⬍ .10; p ⬎
.40). To select the five “conservative wrong” items, we used a
statistical cut-off point (r ⬎ .40; p ⬍ .005) to ensure that items
were significantly associated with political orientation such that
that conservatives judged the items as significantly more wrong.
Based on these criteria, we selected five items from each category
to use as the conservative wrong dependent measures in this study
(see Table 2).
The list of full items and correlations with political ideology can
be seen in at the OSF. Note that the items used in both Study 6a
and 6b were the same, but we changed some of the names of the
protagonists in Study 6b. In the time between conducting our
initial study and the replication, a new article was published that
looked at the effect of names in vignette experiments, providing a
list of names matched in perceived age, warmth, and competence
(Newman, Tan, Caldwell, Duff, & Winer, 2018). To eliminate any
unintentional influence of the names we had chosen, in Study 6b
we, therefore, used names from this list.

Study 6a
Method
Open Science. We report all measures, manipulations, and
exclusions. Results, analysis code, and experiment materials are
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available for download from the OSF. This study received ethical
approval from the IRB of the University of Oregon (“The Effect of
Culture on Attitudes and Outcomes”; Protocol #10162012.023).
Participants. There were 301 American participants who
completed the survey online via MTurk. Participants were excluded from data analysis if they took the survey more than once
(n ⫽ 1) or failed one or both of two simple checks in which they
had to select a certain scale-point in the FAD⫹, and then indicate
at the end of the survey which event they did not answer questions
about (n ⫽ 4). This left a final sample of 294 participants (121
female; Mage ⫽ 32 years). Sample size was determined by available funds and a goal of approximately 150 participants per condition.
Design. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two
conditions (Conservative Wrong; Politically Neutral) in a
between-subjects design. Participants were given a list of five
events that pretesting showed were either differentially perceived
to be more morally wrong to conservatives than to liberals (conservative wrong), or five items on which conservatives and liberals
did not differ in their perceptions of wrongness (politically neutral). For each of these five items (see Table 2), participants were
asked to rate the degree of wrongness and free will the actor had
for each event using the same measures as Study 5 (how much
responsibility, control, free will, and ability to do otherwise). The
order of the events and the five dependent variables for each event
were all randomized, and at the end participants completed the free
will subscale of the FAD⫹.

Results
First, we again looked at correlations of political conservativism
with general free will belief. As in the previous studies, conservatism was significantly positively correlated with scores on the
free will subscale of the FAD⫹, r ⫽ .38, p ⬍ .001, with conservatives showing higher endorsement of both the more abstract, r ⫽
.33, p ⬍ .001 and moral responsibility focused (r ⫽ .37 p ⬍ .001)
items of the scale.
Next, we checked whether political orientation was indeed associated with greater judgments of moral wrongness in the conservative wrong condition. Despite pretesting the political neutral

Table 2
Items by Condition for Study 6b
Conservative wrong
Jennifer has her second abortion in 2 years.
David becomes addicted to drugs and drops out of college.
Ann is out to dinner with some friends and has some gas
pains in her stomach. She decides to release gas, even
though she knows it will make an awful smell.
Sarah made an abstinence-until-marriage vow when she
was 16, but now she’s 18 and in college, and she has
sex with a boyfriend with whom she’s in love.
John pretends to be ill to avoid being sent to war.

Politically neutral
Evelyn is taking a casual walk around the block on a snowy day, and she notices
a driver whose car is stuck in the snow. She keeps walking rather than
stopping to see if she can help.
Paul cleans out his closet and finds several pieces of clothing he no longer wears.
He can dispose of them or drive five miles to the Salvation Army and drop
them in their drop-off box. He throws away the clothes.
Thomas starts smoking a cigarette in a nonsmoking section of a restaurant.
Rachel has sex with another man while her boyfriend is out of town for the
weekend.
Caroline goes into a college dorm community bathroom and uses a random
toothbrush (belonging to someone else) that is lying around. She puts the
toothbrush back and leaves.
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events to be equally morally wrong for liberals and conservatives,
we actually found in the main study that conservatives rated the
politically neutral events to be more wrong, r ⫽ .24, p ⫽ .003,
though unsurprisingly this relationship was much weaker than in
the conservative wrong condition, r ⫽ .57, p ⬍ .001. Across
participants, wrongness ratings were positively associated with
free will attributions for the conservative wrong events, r ⫽ .23,
p ⫽ .005, but not the politically neutral events, r ⫽ .02, p ⫽ .77.
We then turned to our key analyses and examined how morality
condition (⫺1 ⫽ politically neutral; 1 ⫽ conservative wrong) and
participant political orientation (centered) interacted to predict
attributions of free will. We observed a significant interaction of
political ideology and morality condition, b ⫽ .05, SE ⫽ .02, t ⫽
2.18, p ⫽ .030, 95% CI [.00, .09], R2 ⫽ 0.21, semipartial r ⫽ .11,
whereby as predicted conservatives attributed more free will for
the conservative wrong items, b ⫽ .08, SE ⫽ .03, t ⫽ 2.33, p ⫽
.021, 95% CI [.01, .15], R2 ⫽ .04, semipartial r ⫽ .19, but there
was no difference in attributions of free will for the politically
neutral events, b ⫽ ⫺.02, SE ⫽ .03, t ⫽ 0.57, p ⫽ .57, 95% CI
[⫺.07, .04], R2 ⫽ .00, semipartial r ⫽ ⫺.05.
Finally, we tested our prediction that wrongness judgments
would statistically mediate the effect of political orientation on
attributions of free will in the conservative wrong condition. We
began by conducting a moderated mediation analysis looking at
whether the wrongness condition moderated the mediation of
wrongness judgments on the path from political orientation to
attributions of free will. We observed significant moderation, 95%
CI [.03, .10], which we then probed by looking at the mediation of
wrongness judgments within each condition (10,000 resamples).
We found that the mediation effect was stronger (and marginal) in
the conservative wrong condition, b ⫽ .04, SE ⫽ .02, 95% CI
[⫺.00, 0.09], Z ⫽ 1.79, p ⫽ .07, than in the politically neutral
condition, b ⫽ .00, SE ⫽ .01, 95% CI [⫺.01, 0.2], Z ⫽ 0.44, p ⫽
.66, but note that wrongness judgments did not significantly mediate the effect of political orientation on free will attributions in
either condition at traditional levels of statistical significance.

Discussion
In Study 6a, we tested the prediction that conservatives’ greater
attributions of free will would only be observed for events that
they saw to be more morally wrong, and that these perceptions of
wrongness would mediate the relationship between political orientation and free will attributions. Interestingly, despite having
pretested items to be politically neutral in perceived moral wrongness, conservatives still showed a tendency to find the politically
neutral items more morally wrong, further supporting the view that
conservatives moralize more than liberals. As predicted, higher
political conservatism only predicted higher free will attributions
for actions that were pretested to be perceived as more wrong by
conservatives. We also found some suggestive, but not statistically
significant, evidence that moral wrongness statistically mediated
the relationship between more conservative political ideology and
attributions of free will mainly in the conservative wrong condition. In Study 6b we sought to enhance our confidence in these
results by conducting a new preregistered replication with a larger
sample size.

Study 6b
Method
Open Science. Our design, hypotheses, and analysis plan
were all preregistered at the OSF. We report all measures, manipulations, and exclusions, and analysis code, and experiment materials are available for download from the OSF. This study received
ethical approval from the IRB of the University of British Columbia (“Social Impacts of Emerging Technology”; Protocol #H1802727).
Participants. Five hundred ninety-one American participants
completed the survey online via MTurk. Participants were excluded from data analysis if they took the survey more than once
(n ⫽ 10) or failed one or both of two simple checks in which they
had to select a certain scale-point in the FAD⫹ and then indicate
at the end of the survey which event they did not answer questions
about (n ⫽ 26). This left a final sample of 555 participants (280
female; Mage ⫽ 37 years).
Design. This study was identical to Study 6a, except that we
replaced some of the names of the protagonists to ensure they were
matched in perceived age, warmth, and competence (Newman et
al., 2018; see discussion in pretest).

Results
First, we again looked at correlations of political conservativism
with general free will belief. As in the previous studies, conservatism was significantly positively correlated with scores on the
free will subscale of the FAD⫹, r ⫽ .33, p ⬍ .001, with conservatives showing higher endorsement of both the more abstract, r ⫽
.29, p ⬍ .001 and moral responsibility focused (r ⫽ .34 p ⬍ .001)
items of the scale.
Next, we checked whether political orientation was indeed associated with greater judgments of moral wrongness in the conservative wrong condition. Here, political ideology was significantly associated with thinking the moral transgressions were more
wrong, r ⫽ .51, p ⬍ .001, but in the matched condition with items
pretested to be politically neutral, we found no correlation of
political ideology with wrongness ratings, r ⫽ .08, p ⫽ .21. Across
participants, wrongness ratings were positively associated with
free will attributions, both for the conservative wrong events, r ⫽
.24, p ⬍ .001 and the politically neutral events, r ⫽ .16, p ⫽ .007.
We then turned to our key analyses and examined how morality
condition (⫺1 ⫽ politically neutral; 1 ⫽ conservative wrong) and
participant political orientation (centered) interacted to predict
attributions of free will. We observed a significant interaction of
political ideology and morality condition, b ⫽ .05, SE ⫽ .02, t ⫽
2.71, p ⫽ .007, 95% CI [.01, .08], R2 ⫽ .11, semipartial r ⫽ .11,
whereby as predicted conservative ideology predicted more free
will for the conservative wrong items, b ⫽ .09, SE ⫽ .02, t ⫽ 3.76,
p ⬍ .001, 95% CI [.04, .14], R2 ⫽ .05, semipartial r ⫽ .22, but
there was no difference in attributions of free will for the politically neutral events, b ⫽ .00, SE ⫽ .02, t ⫽ 0.01, p ⫽ .99, 95% CI
[⫺.05, .05], R2 ⫽ .00, semipartial r ⫽ ⫺.00.
Finally, we observed significant moderated mediation, 95% CI
[.04, .08], which we then probed by looking at the mediation of
wrongness judgments within each condition (10,000 resamples).
With this larger sample size, we found that wrongness judgments
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statistically significantly mediated the effect of more conservative
political ideology on higher free will attributions in the conservative wrong condition, b ⫽ .04, SE ⫽ .02, 95% CI [.01, .06], Z ⫽
2.41, p ⫽ .02, but not in the politically neutral condition, b ⫽ .05,
SE ⫽ .00, 95% CI [⫺.00, .01], Z ⫽ 1.15, p ⫽ .25.
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Discussion
In Study 6b, we conducted a preregistered replication of Study
6a to test our prediction that conservatives’ greater attributions of
free will would only be observed for events that they saw to be
more morally wrong, and that these perceptions of wrongness
would mediate the relationship between political orientation and
free will attributions. Confirming our predictions, political ideology only predicted free will attributions for actions pretested to be
perceived as more wrong by conservatives, and the relationship
between ideology and free will attributions was statistically mediated by perceptions of moral wrongness. Together, the results of
Studies 6a and 6b provide further support for our main hypothesis
that the relationship between political ideology and free will beliefs can be at least partially linked to differential perceptions of
moral wrongness and blameworthiness.

Study 7
It seems likely that political differences in attributions of free
will (Study 3) are not reflecting some genuine disagreement about
the basis of human freedom, given that these differences appear
only for those events that are also judged as differentially morally
wrong (Studies 4 – 6). Philosophically, the concept of free will
should be domain-general and enduring: the deterministic laws of
the universe are unlikely to be sensitive to the specific moral
qualities of the action. Perhaps psychologically, though, people
have heuristics about which actions require more or less free will
(regardless of the philosophical coherence of such a stance). If this
were the case, perhaps conservatives and liberals simply have
different heuristics about which actions are more free, and higher
perceptions of freedom cause stronger judgments of moral wrongness rather than the reverse motivated reasoning pattern we hypothesize (where moral assessments influence free will assessments). In our final set of studies, therefore, we wanted to conduct
an even more direct test of the specifically motivated basis of
political differences in attributions of free will by looking at
whether liberals and conservatives would differentially attribute
free will for the same action that differed only on who performed
it so as to isolate motivations to blame. We do this across four
studies, Studies 7a–7d. These are the only four studies we have
conducted testing this interaction (i.e., there are no file drawer
studies).

Study 7a
Method
Open Science and ethics statement. We report all measures,
manipulations, and exclusions. Results, analysis code, and experiment materials are available for download at the OSF. This study,
along with Studies 7b, 7c, and 7d, received ethical approval from
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the IRB of the University of British Columbia (“Social Impacts of
Emerging Technology”; Protocol #H18-02727).
Participants. There were 600 American participants who
completed the survey online via MTurk. Participants were excluded from data analysis if they took the survey more than once
(n ⫽ 1) or failed one or both of two simple checks in which they
had to select a certain scale-point in the FAD⫹, and then correctly
report at the end of the study what the protagonist in the vignette
had done (n ⫽ 7). This left a final sample of 592 participants (321
female; Mage ⫽ 38 years).
Pretests. We completed two pretests on MTurk to find events
to use for Study 7a. In both pretests we only asked participant to
rate wrongness and blameworthiness and not free will to avoid
biasing item selection.
In our first pretest (n ⫽ 249), we used six conventional moral
violations and simply varied whether the actor was characteristically left- or right-wing (see materials on the OSF for the wording
of all events and the corresponding results). For example, in one
event we described to participants someone “who regularly
smokes cigarettes indoors around his small child,” and varied
whether this person was “an activist who frequently protests
against Wall Street” or “a wealthy Wall Street banker.” In another
event we described someone who was “recently arrested for driving while approximately two drinks over the legal driving limit,”
and varied whether this person “conducts research for a think tank
and investigates how pervasive racism might explain disparate
outcomes between racial groups” or “conducts research for a think
tank and investigates genetic differences between races that might
explain disparate outcomes between racial groups.” Across these
events, we failed to find significant interactions between participants’ own political beliefs and the apparent political beliefs of the
target: participants tended to rate the moral violation as equally
wrong regardless of whether it was a left or right-wing person
doing it. In other words, for these general behaviors, liberals and
conservatives displayed no favoritism toward their own political
ingroup members in terms of their moral evaluations. While pleasant from a normative perspective, this rendered these events unfit
for our purposes in the main study.
To this end, we conducted a second pretest (n ⫽ 300) in which
we gave participants longer descriptions of moral violations that an
actor performed in the context of achieving certain political goals
(see materials on the OSF for the wording of all events and the
corresponding results). This was done for two reasons: first, by
giving more detailed information we hoped to make it less obvious
to participants that we expected them to use the actor’s political
affiliation as a cue to wrongness; and second, to leverage partisan
intergroup cognition that would plausibly make the moral violations more acceptable if it was done against “them”, for “us.” One
item concerned using charity funds to buy a more expensive suit
for oneself in the hopes this will impress donors for one’s charity;
one concerned blackmailing a town mayor about his use of prostitutes to get him to publicly support one’s social movement; and
one concerned a student who gets violent at a protest. As before,
in this pretest we measured only participants ratings of wrongness
and blameworthiness, not free will, in order to avoid biasing our
item selection. There was no significant interaction between participant political orientation and the political leanings of the target
on ratings of wrongness for the first item, but there was for the
second and third items, so these were the ones used in Study 7a.
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Design. All participants read a short story about an immoral
action performed by “Noah.” In a between-subjects design, participants were randomly assigned to learn that Noah was either
politically conservative or liberal and performed the action in the
context of achieving these political ends. To increase confidence in
the generalizability of our results, as an additional betweensubjects factor we used two different events (violence at a protest
and blackmail). As noted above, pretesting revealed that in both
events, the same action was perceived as differently wrong depending on the participant’s political beliefs and the beliefs of the
actor.
In the first story, participants read that Noah was a college
student who gets caught up in a student protest and “In the heat of
the moment, throws a glass bottle at the other protestor—though
luckily, it didn’t hit them.” For half of our participants, Noah was
described as supporting “the Antifa movement—a left-wing protest movement that often gets into violent clashes with more
right-wing protesters.” The other half of participants read instead
that Noah supported “the Patriot Movement—a right-wing protest
movement that often gets into violent clashes with more left-wing
protesters.” Full text can be seen at the OSF.
In the second story, participants read that Noah was the local
chapter head of a political group who blackmails the mayor of his
town in order to obtain support for his movement. For half of our
participants, Noah was described was leading the local “Black
Lives Matter” movement, and blackmails the mayor into “calling
for stricter punishment for police who kill black people.” For the
other half, Noah was described as leading the local “Blue Lives
Matter” and instead blackmails the mayor into “calling for stricter
punishment for people that kill law enforcement officers.”
After reading the story, participants were asked to rate the
degree of free will, wrongness, and blameworthiness associated
with each described event (as in Studies 3– 6). The order of the five
dependent variables was randomized, and at the end participants
completed the free will subscale of the FAD⫹.
As anticipated, results were the same for both stories and so we
report our main analyses combining across the two. Full results for
each individually can be seen at the OSF.

Results
First, we looked at correlations of political conservativism with
general free will belief. As in the previous studies, conservatism
was significantly positively correlated with scores on the free will
subscale of the FAD⫹, r ⫽ .25, p ⬍ .001, with conservatives
showing higher endorsement of both the more abstract, r ⫽ .23,
p ⬍ .001 and moral responsibility focused (r ⫽ .23 p ⬍ .001) items
of the scale.
Second, we confirmed that participants did perceive the
moral violation to be more wrong when the agent and the
agent’s actions opposed their own political group than when the
agent and the agent’s actions supported their own political
group. A regression analysis revealed a significant interaction
between the agent’s political position (⫺1 right-wing target, 1
left-wing target) and participant’s own political orientation
(centered) on ratings of moral wrongness, b ⫽ .21, SE ⫽ .03,
t ⫽ 6.37, p ⬍ .001, 95% CI [.15, .28], R2 ⫽ 0.07, semipartial
r ⫽ .25. Whereas participant conservatism predicted thinking
the left-wing agent performed a more morally wrong action,

b ⫽ .22, SE ⫽ .05, t ⫽ 4.60, p ⬍ .001, 95% CI [.12, .31], R2 ⫽
0.07, semipartial r ⫽ .26, political liberalism predicted thinking
the right-wing agent performed a more morally wrong action,
b ⫽ ⫺.20, SE ⫽ .05, t ⫽ ⫺4.41, p ⬍ .001, 95% CI
[⫺.29, ⫺.11], R2 ⫽ 0.06, semipartial r ⫽ ⫺0.25.
Finally, we turned to our main analysis of whether participants
attributed differential free will for the same action depending on
their own political beliefs (centered) and the political beliefs of the
actor (⫺1 right-wing target, 1 left-wing target). The interaction did
not reach statistical significance, b ⫽ .03, SE ⫽ .02, t ⫽ 1.70, p ⫽
.089, 95% CI [⫺.01, .07], R2 ⫽ 0.01, semipartial r ⫽ .07, and
simple effects indicated that political conservatism predicted lower
attributions of free will toward the right-wing target, b ⫽ ⫺.07,
SE ⫽ .03, t ⫽ ⫺2.38, p ⫽ .018, 95% CI [⫺.12, ⫺.01] R2 ⫽ 0.02,
semipartial r ⫽ ⫺0.14, but not the left-wing target b ⫽ .00, SE ⫽
.03, t ⫽ 0.12, p ⫽ .91, 95% CI [⫺.05, .06] R2 ⫽ 0.00, semipartial
r ⫽ .01. Probing this further by looking at attributions of free will
by self-identified Republican (n ⫽ 160) and Democrat (n ⫽ 249)
participants, we found a significant interaction of participant political affiliation and the agent’s political beliefs on attributions of
free will, F(1, 405) ⫽ 3.99, p ⫽ .047, p ⫽ .01, partial 2 ⫽ .01.
Simple effects results revealed that whereas Democrats attributed
marginally more free will to the right-wing than left-wing agent,
t(246.83) ⫽ ⫺1.80, p ⫽ .074, d ⫽ 0.23, Republicans, however, did
not significantly differ in the degree of free will they attributed to
both agents, t(158) ⫽ 1.12, p ⫽ .266, d ⫽ 0.18.

Discussion
In Study 7a, we took a different approach to exploring the
motivated basis of free will belief by looking at whether participants’ political orientation might lead to differential attributions of
free will for the same action depending on who performed it. Using
two different moral violations that yielded the same results, we
found tentative— but weak— evidence in support of our predictions: there was the suggestion of differential free will attributions
for the same action depending on participants’ own political beliefs, though this was not significant.
Though these results appear to only weakly align with the
findings of the previous studies, ceiling effects in Study 7a’s
measures of both moral violation and free will may have limited
our ability to properly test our hypothesis. Regardless of the
actor’s political beliefs, both Republican and Democrat participants thought the moral violation very wrong (all means ⬎5.8
on a 1–7 scale) and—more problematically—attributed high
free will to both actors (all means ⬎6.19 on a 1–7 scale).
Previous work has shown that because people like to see
themselves as fair and objective judges, motivated reasoning is
most pronounced in situations where plausibility constraints are
loose and ambiguous (Ditto & Boardman, 1995; Ditto & Lopez,
1992; Dunning, Leuenberger, & Sherman, 1995). The events
described clear moral violations, and with such high free attributions across the board, there might have been little room for
motivated blame to selectively increase free will attributions for
the politically opposing agent. Given this, in Study 7b we
sought to run the study again, but with events that were more
morally ambiguous.
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Method
Open Science. We report all measures, manipulations, and
exclusions. Results, analysis code, and experiment materials are
available for download from the OSF.
Participants. There were 600 American participants who
completed the survey online via MTurk. Participants were excluded from data analysis if they took the survey more than once
(n ⫽ 0) or failed one or both of two simple checks in which they
had to select a certain scale-point in the FAD⫹, and then correctly
report at the end of the study what the protagonist in the vignette
had done (n ⫽ 34). This left a final sample of 566 participants (274
female; Mage ⫽ 38 years).
Design. This study had the same design as Study 7a, where
again participants read a story describing a moral violation and in
a between-subjects design we manipulated whether the actor was
politically right-wing or left-wing and performed the action in the
context of achieving those political ends. Again, to increase confidence in the generalizability of our results, as an additional
between-subjects factor, we used two different events, but sought
to use scenarios more ambiguously immoral than in Study 7a
(staying silent about disruption at a protest; not retracting a magazine expose based on an unreliable source). Pretesting (see details
at OSF) revealed that in both events, the same action was perceived as differently wrong depending on the participant’s political
beliefs and the beliefs of the actor (and that overall, the items were
rated as less wrong than the items in Study 7a).
In the first story, participants read about “Anna”: an editor and
journalist who publishes a widely discussed and influential expose
about a sex scandal among the highest members of a political
party. Participants were told that “A few months after this expose
was released, Anna learns about serious problems with her source
which makes her doubt whether they are telling the truth. The
source is adamant they are telling the truth, but Anna has found
that they have made false accusations in the past. Usually Anna
would be required to publish a retraction, but because the evidence
of lying is not conclusive, she does not issue a correction.” For half
of our participants, Anna was described as being the editor of a
“prominent left-wing online journal known for regularly and
strongly attacking the Republican party,” who publishes an expose
about a sex scandal in the Republican party. For the other half,
Anna was described as being the editor of a “prominent right-wing
online journal” who publishes an expose about a sex scandal in the
Democratic party.
In the second story, participants read about Noah, a politically
active college student who is peacefully protesting a visit by a
controversial speaker. During the protest, Noah observes a fellow
student “cut the sound for the speaker, meaning that no-one can
hear the talk and it has to be called off.” Participants were told that
the police want to find and prosecute the activist “to make an
example of them, drawing attention to what they see as a rising
problem of right/left-wing activists,” but “When the police come
and question Noah, he says that he did not see who cut the sound.”
Half of our participants were told that both Noah and the activist
who cut the sound were members of the “Young Republicans
Society” and were protesting a controversial left-wing speaker.
The other half were told that Noah and the activist were members

475

of the “Young Democrats Society” and were protesting a rightwing speaker (see full wording on the OSF).
The dependent measures were the same as in Study 7a and
because results were again the same for both stories, we report our
main analyses combining across the two (see OSF for results for
event separately).

Results
First, we looked at correlations of political conservativism with
general free will belief. As in the previous studies, conservatism
was significantly positively correlated with scores on the free will
subscale of the FAD⫹, r ⫽ .16, p ⬍ .001, with conservatives
showing higher endorsement of both the more abstract, r ⫽ .29,
p ⬍ .001 and moral responsibility focused (r ⫽ .26, p ⬍ .001)
items of the scale.
Second, we confirmed that participants did perceive the moral
violation to be more wrong when the target opposed rather than
supported their own political interests. A regression analysis revealed a significant interaction between the agent’s political position (⫺1 right-wing target, 1 left-wing target) and participant’s
own political orientation (centered) on ratings of moral wrongness,
b ⫽ .27, SE ⫽ .04, t ⫽ 6.82, p ⬍ .001, 95% CI [.19, .35], R2 ⫽
0.13, semipartial r ⫽ .27. Whereas participant conservatism predicted thinking the left-wing agent performed a more morally
wrong action, b ⫽ .50, SE ⫽ .05, t ⫽ 9.31, p ⬍ .001, 95% CI [.39,
.60], R2 ⫽ 0.23, semipartial r ⫽ .48, despite our pretesting, we
found no effect of political orientation on wrongness ratings of the
conservative target, b ⫽ ⫺.04, SE ⫽ .06, t ⫽ ⫺0.72, p ⫽ .48, 95%
CI [⫺.16, ⫺.07] R2 ⫽ 0.00, semipartial r ⫽ ⫺0.04.
Finally, we turned to our main analysis of whether participants
attributed differential free will for the same action depending on
their own political beliefs (centered) and the political beliefs of the
actor (⫺1 right-wing target, 1 left-wing target). We observed a
significant interaction, b ⫽ .09, SE ⫽ .02, t ⫽ 3.85, p ⬍ .001, 95%
CI [.05, .14], R2 ⫽ 0.03, semipartial r ⫽ .16, where simple effects
indicated that political conservatism predicted greater attributions
of free will toward the left-wing target, b ⫽ .13, SE ⫽ .03, t ⫽
3.90, p ⬍ .001, 95% CI [.06, .19], R2 ⫽ 0.05, semipartial r ⫽ .23,
but there was no significant effect of participant political orientation on attributions of free will toward the right-wing target
(though the direction of results was as expected), b ⫽ ⫺.06, SE ⫽
.04, t ⫽ 0.11, p ⫽ .11, 95% CI [⫺.13, .01], R2 ⫽ 0.01, semipartial
r ⫽ ⫺0.10 (see Figure 3). Again probing this further by looking at
attributions of free will by self-identified Republican (n ⫽ 140)
and Democrat (n ⫽ 235) participants, we found a significant
interaction of participant political affiliation and the agent’s political beliefs on attributions of free will, F(1, 371) ⫽ 7.46, p ⫽ .007,
partial 2 ⫽ .02. Simple effects results revealed that Democrats
attributed significantly more free will to the right-wing than leftwing agent, t(232.98) ⫽ 2.17, p ⫽ .031, d ⫽ 0.28, and there was
a trend for Republican participants to attribute more free will to the
left-wing agent than the right wing one, though this was only
marginally significant, t(128.05) ⫽ ⫺1.80, p ⫽ .074, d ⫽ 0.30.

Discussion
In Study 7b we found further evidence for the motivated basis of
free will belief by showing that participants attribute different
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Results

Figure 3. Attributions of free will as a function of participant political
ideology and the political beliefs of the actor (Study 7b). See the online
article for the color version of this figure.

levels of free will for the same action depending on whether
someone shares or disagrees with their own political stance. Note,
however, that our claim is not that political conservatives and
liberals will always differentially attribute free will for the same
event depending on who does it, just as we are not claiming that
political conservatives and liberals will always make in-group
favoring biased moral judgments (indeed, our first pretest for
Study 7a shows that this is not the case). Instead, we arguing that
where there is a motivation to differentially blame the target that
emerges in biased ratings of moral wrongness, there will typically
be a motivation to differentially attribute free will too. To confirm
our results, in Study 7c we opted to conduct our second preregistered replication of this series.

Study 7c
Method
Open Science. Our design, hypotheses, and analysis plan
were all preregistered at the OSF. We report all measures, manipulations, and exclusions, and analysis code, and experiment materials are available for download from the OSF.
Participants. There were 595 American participants who
completed the survey online via MTurk. Participants were excluded from data analysis if they took the survey more than once
(n ⫽ 0) or failed one or both of two simple checks in which they
had to select a certain scale-point in the FAD⫹, and then correctly
report at the end of the study what the protagonist in the vignette
had done (n ⫽ 58). This left a final sample of 537 participants (255
female; Mage ⫽ 38 years).
Design. This study had the same design as Study 7b.

First, we looked at correlations of political conservativism with
general free will belief. As in the previous studies, conservatism
was significantly positively correlated with scores on the free will
subscale of the FAD⫹, r ⫽ .28, p ⬍ .001, with conservatives
showing higher endorsement of both the more abstract, r ⫽ .26,
p ⬍ .001 and moral responsibility focused (r ⫽ .25, p ⬍ .001)
items of the scale.
Second, we confirmed that participants did perceive the moral
violation to be more wrong when the agent opposed rather than
aligned with their own political interests. A regression analysis
revealed a significant interaction between the agent’s political
position (⫺1 right-wing target, 1 left-wing target) and participant’s
own political orientation (centered) on ratings of moral wrongness,
b ⫽ .25, SE ⫽ .04, t ⫽ 5.86, p ⬍ .001, 95% CI [.17, .33], R2 ⫽
0.09, semipartial r ⫽ .24. Whereas participant conservatism predicted thinking the left-wing agent performed a more morally
wrong action, b ⫽ .41, SE ⫽ .06, t ⫽ 6.87, p ⬍ .001, 95% CI [.30,
.53], R2 ⫽ 0.15, semipartial r ⫽ .39 despite our pretesting (but as
in Study 7b), we found no effect of political orientation on wrongness ratings of the conservative target, b ⫽ ⫺.08, SE ⫽ .06,
t ⫽ ⫺1.39, p ⫽ .17, 95% CI [⫺.02, ⫺.03], R2 ⫽ 0.01, semipartial
r ⫽ ⫺0.08.
Finally, we turned to our main analysis of whether participants
attributed differential free will for the same action depending on
their own political beliefs (centered) and the political beliefs of the
actor (⫺1 right-wing target, 1 left-wing target). Despite the fact
that this was a direct registered replication on Study 7b in which
we found a significant interaction, the interaction here was nonsignificant, b ⫽ .01, SE ⫽ .03, t ⫽ 0.32, p ⫽ .75, 95% CI [⫺.06,
.08], R2 ⫽ 0.00, semipartial r ⫽ .03. Surprisingly, political conservatism did not predict greater attributions of free will toward
either the left-wing target, b ⫽ .01, SE ⫽ .03, t ⫽ 0.32, p ⫽ .75,
95% CI [⫺.06, .08], R2 ⫽ 0.00, semipartial r ⫽ .02, or the
right-wing target, b ⫽ ⫺.02, SE ⫽ .04, t ⫽ ⫺0.58, p ⫽ .56, 95%
CI [⫺.09, .05], R2 ⫽ 0.00, semipartial r ⫽ ⫺0.04. Similarly, when
looking at attributions of free will by self-identified Republican
(n ⫽ 131) and Democrat (n ⫽ 232) participants, we found no
interaction of participant political affiliation and the agent’s political beliefs on attributions of free will, F(1, 359) ⫽ 0.59, p ⫽ .44,
partial 2 ⫽ .00.

Discussion
In Study 7c we conducted our second preregistered replication
in this package of studies. We sought to replicate our finding from
Study 7b that participants attribute different levels of free will for
the same action depending on whether someone shares or disagrees with their own political stance. Surprisingly, our key interaction was not significant— despite using the same materials,
sample recruitment, participant exclusion rules, and data analysis.
How to explain this? One possibility is that on the 1–7 scale, we
had high free will attributions across the board (⬎5.5), potentially
leading to ceiling effects. Another possibility is the time we ran the
study. The data for Study 7c were collected between 12 and 6 a.m.
PST (3 to 9 a.m. EST). With our restriction that participants
needed to be from the United States to complete the study, this
meant that participants were completing the study in the middle of
the night. Despite using the same attention and comprehension
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checks used across the studies in this article, it is possible that
participants were still not attending as thoroughly as they would
have been if they were completing the study during the day.
Perhaps the null results in Study 7c were just a fluke, potentially
influenced by ceiling effects and/or the unusual time of data
collection. Or perhaps it was the significant effect in Study 7b that
was the fluke, and that there was no real effect to find at all. In
Study 7d we sought conduct one final preregistered replication to
settle the matter, making sure to collect the data during the day
while also using a larger sample size and increasing the scale
variance from 1–7 to 0 –100.

Study 7d
Method
Open Science. Our design, hypotheses, and analysis plan
were all preregistered at the OSF. As for all studies in this article,
we report all measures, manipulations, and exclusions, and analysis code, and experiment materials are available for download
from the OSF.
Participants. We recruited 900 American participants via
MTurk, 884 of whom completed the survey. Participants were
excluded from data analysis if they took the survey more than once
(n ⫽ 1) or failed one or both of two simple checks in which they
had to select a certain scale-point in the FAD⫹, and then correctly
report at the end of the study what the protagonist in the vignette
had done (n ⫽ 68). This left a final sample of 815 participants (478
female; Mage ⫽ 37 years).
Design. This study had the same design as Study 7b and 7c,
with the exception that, in Study 7d, the dependent measures were
on a 0 –100 scale instead of 1–7 scale, and we also included an
additional question about how severely participants thought the
agent should be punished for their action.
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Finally, we turned to our main analysis of whether participants
attributed differential free will for the same action depending on
their own political beliefs (centered) and the political beliefs and
interests of the actor (⫺1 right-wing target, 1 left-wing target). We
observed a significant interaction, b ⫽ 1.45, SE ⫽ .035, t ⫽ 4.15,
p ⬍ .001, 95% CI [.77, 2.14], R2 ⫽ 0.03, semipartial r ⫽ .14.
Simple effects indicated that political conservatism negatively
predicted attributions of free will toward the right-wing target,
b ⫽ ⫺2.03, SE ⫽ .48, t ⫽ ⫺4.27, p ⬍ .001, 95% CI
[⫺2.97, ⫺1.10], R2 ⫽ 0.04, semipartial r ⫽ ⫺0.21. The effect of
participant conservatism on free will attributions for the left-wing
agent was not significant, though the direction of results was as
expected: b ⫽ 0.88, SE ⫽ .52, t ⫽ 1.70, p ⫽ .090, 95% CI [⫺.14,
1.89], R2 ⫽ 0.01, semipartial r ⫽ .08 (see Figure 4). Again probing
this further by looking at attributions of free will by self-identified
Republican (n ⫽ 180) and Democrat (n ⫽ 354) participants, we
found a significant interaction of participant political affiliation
and the agent’s political beliefs on attributions of free will, F(1,
530) ⫽ 6.80, p ⫽ .009, partial 2 ⫽ .01. Simple effects results
revealed that Republicans attributed significantly more free will to
the left-wing agent, t(176.46) ⫽ 2.35, p ⫽ .020, d ⫽ 0.35, but
Democrats did not differ in attributions depending on the agent,
t(345.74) ⫽ ⫺1.18, p ⫽ .24, d ⫽ ⫺0.13.

Discussion
In Study 7d we conducted a final preregistered replication in
attempt to clarify inconsistencies in our findings in Study 7a– c.
With a larger sample size and increasing the scale variance from
1–7 to 0 –100, we replicated the significant interaction found in
Study 7b: participants attributed different levels of free will for the

Results
First, we looked at correlations of political conservativism with
general free will belief. As in the previous studies, conservatism
was significantly positively correlated with scores on the free will
subscale of the FAD⫹, r ⫽ .34, p ⬍ .001, with conservatives
showing higher endorsement of both the more abstract, r ⫽ .30,
p ⬍ .001 and moral responsibility focused (r ⫽ .32, p ⬍ .001)
items of the scale.
Second, we confirmed that participants did perceive the moral
violation as more wrong when the agent aligned with—rather than
opposed—their own political interests. A regression analysis revealed a significant interaction between the agent’s political position (⫺1 right-wing target, 1 left-wing target) and participant’s
own political orientation (centered) on ratings of moral wrongness,
b ⫽ 5.33, SE ⫽ .58, t ⫽ 9.12, p ⬍ .001, 95% CI [.4.19, 6.48], R2 ⫽
0.13, semipartial r ⫽ .30. Participant conservatism positively
predicted thinking the left-wing agent performed a more morally
wrong action, b ⫽ 7.82, SE ⫽ .86, t ⫽ 9.07, p ⬍ .001, 95% CI
[6.12, 9.51], R2 ⫽ 0.17, semipartial r ⫽ .41, and negatively
predicted wrongness ratings for the same action when performed
by a right-wing agent, b ⫽ ⫺2.85, SE ⫽ .79, t ⫽ ⫺3.60, p ⬍ .001,
95% CI [⫺4.41, ⫺1.29], R2 ⫽ 0.03, semipartial r ⫽ ⫺0.17.

Figure 4. Attributions of free will as a function of participant political
ideology and the political beliefs of the actor (Study 7d). See the online
article for the color version of this figure.
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same action depending on whether the target shared or disagreed
with their own political stance.

Study 7e: Meta-Analysis of Studies 7a–7d
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Because the effect sizes for the interaction between ideology
and the experimental manipulation varied somewhat across Studies 7a–7d, we concluded with minimeta-analyses of the interaction
effect for these four studies. As noted in the introduction, we have
reported in the article all the studies we have run testing this
interaction.

free will than liberals (Carey & Paulhus, 2013). In this article we
sought to test the hypothesis that political differences in free will
belief do not reflect some genuine principled disagreement about
the metaphysical nature of human freedom, but rather are largely
explicable through motivated reasoning. Previous work has shown
that, in general, free will beliefs are motivated by desires to punish
others and to justify holding them morally responsible (Clark,
Baumeister, et al., 2017; Clark et al., 2014, 2018, 2019), and in this
article we tested whether the reason that conservatives tend to
attribute more free will is because they have a stronger tendency to
moralize, perceiving a wider spectrum of transgressions for which
moral responsibility must be assigned and moral blame attributed.

Method
We used procedures outlined by Goh and colleagues (2016) for
conducting minimeta-analyses on the four interaction effects between ideology and the experimental manipulation in Studies
7a–7d. Because the methods used across studies were very similar
(in which case fixed effects, which weights by sample size, might
be preferred), but not quite identical (in which case random effects,
which treats all effects equally, might be preferred), we report both
fixed and random effects, though note the random effects approach
is very conservative with only four effect sizes (Goh et al., 2016).
We used semipartial rs as estimates of the effect size for the
interaction terms. For fixed effects, the four rs were Fisher’s Z
transformed to rzs, which were then weighted and averaged using
the following formula: Weighted r̄z ⫽ ⌺ ([N-3] rz)/⌺ (N-3). The
weighted r̄z was then converted back to a Pearson’s r correlation
for presentation. To determine statistical significance, we utilized
the Stouffer’s Z test, in which the p values for each interaction
effect were converted to Zs, combined using the following formula: Zcombined ⫽ ⌺ Z/sqrt(k), and then converted back to ps for
presentation. For random effects, we conducted a single sample t
test of the semipartial rs.

Results
For both random effects, r ⫽ .101, p ⫽ .048 and fixed effects,
r ⫽ .106, p ⬍ .0001, there were small but statistically significant
effects of the interaction between ideology and the experimental
manipulation on free will attributions.

Discussion
Though we found slightly different results across Studies 7a–7d,
when analyzed together in a meta-analysis, these studies provided
evidence for the existence of the hypothesized interaction. Thus,
free will attributions for identical actions, vary as a function of
whether those actions oppose or align with one’s own political
interests. In our view, these results provide the most compelling
support for our contention that differences in perceptions of free
will between liberals and conservatives reflect varying motivations
to blame rather than principled and consistent beliefs about human
freedom and control.

General Discussion
Personal responsibility and autonomy feature heavily in conservative ideologies (Reagan, 1968; Thatcher, 1981), and recent evidence has suggested that conservatives exhibit greater belief in

Overview of Findings
In Study 1, we directly tested our background assumption that
political conservatives have a stronger tendency to moralize
(though this does not, of course, mean that conservatives always
see things as more wrong than liberals: see Study 5). Metaanalyzing five new studies drawn from a variety of populations
(total n ⫽ 308,499), we show that political ideology was consistently associated with moralization. Political conservatism was
associated with greater wrongness judgments in the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (Study 1a); with perceiving minor everyday
moral violations to be more wrong (Study 1b); with judging a
variety of traits as more necessary for someone to be a morally
good person (Study 1c); with perceiving someone as a bad person
based on an image of their face (Study 1d); and as rating personality traits as more morally bad (Study 1e).
In Study 2, we turned to investigate our main question of
political differences in free will belief. Using a large sample of
yourmorals.org data (n ⫽ 14,707) we looked at the relationship
among political ideology, free will belief, and moralization. Replicating previous work (Carey & Paulhus, 2013), we found that
political conservatism was indeed associated with a greater belief
in abstract free will. As would be expected if this relationship
arises partially from moralization, we found that beliefs that people
are morally responsible for their bad behaviors statistically mediated the relationship between more conservative ideology and
stronger beliefs in free will.
In Study 3, we turned away from reports of general, abstract
belief in free will to look at attributions of free will for specific
events. More specifically, we wanted to look at attributions of free
will for both positive and negative events. We found that political
ideology predicted free will attributions overall, and there was an
indication that this relationship was stronger for negative than
positive events. Conceptually, the capacity for free will should
hold whether one experiences good or bad outcomes, and so if
ideology is genuinely related to an abstract belief in free will, there
should have been no difference depending on the valence of the
outcomes. The fact that conservatism predicted higher free will
attributions mainly for negative events is consistent with the claim
that free will attributions are not, or at least not solely, reflecting
some dispositional variance in a belief in human autonomy, but a
more basic, social psychological phenomenon—likely one relating
to blame.
In Study 4, we considered that if political conservatives are
more likely to attribute free will because they see more things as
morally wrong, this association should not be observed when
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looking at attributions of free will for specific events that are
perceived as equally (im)moral for liberals and conservatives.
Using a range of both moral and nonmoral, and positive and
negative events that were pretested to be equally matched in
morality and valence among political liberals and conservatives,
we found no relationship between political ideology and free will
attributions. Again, these results were consistent with our theory
that differences in conservatives’ and liberals’ perceptions of free
will may be partially because of differences in moralization, rather
than representing any generalized, abstract belief that human behaviors are freely chosen.
In Study 5, we tested whether—if the typical tendency for
conservatives to endorse stronger beliefs in free will is because of
blame motives—this association would be reversed for those less
frequent events that conservatives perceive as less morally wrong
than their liberal counterparts. Whereas conservatives again reported higher general, abstract belief in free will as measured by
the FAD⫹, when using events that liberals saw as more morally
wrong than conservatives, it was liberals that attributed more free
will.
In Study 6, we tested the prediction that conservatives’ greater
attributions of free will would only be observed for events that
they saw to be more morally wrong, and that these perceptions of
wrongness would mediate the relationship between political orientation and free will attributions. In two studies—an initial one
(Study 6a), and then a preregistered replication with a larger
sample size (Study 6b)—we confirmed our predictions, showing
that political ideology only predicted free will attributions for
actions that pretested to be perceived as more wrong by conservatives, and this relationship was statistically mediated by perceptions of moral wrongness. Again, this supports our contention that
political differences in free will beliefs are linked to differential
perceptions of moral wrongness and blameworthiness.
In Study 7, we took a different approach. Instead of manipulating the moral content of the event and then looking at how political
ideology is associated with free attributions, we looked at whether
liberals and conservatives would differentially attribute free will
for the same action depending on who performed it. In Study 7a,
we used two different moral violations (violence at a protest;
blackmail) and told participants that the action was performed by
a left-wing or right-wing agent. Across both events we found
tentative— but weak— evidence in support of our predictions:
there was the suggestion of differential free will attributions for the
same action depending on participants’ own political beliefs,
though this was not significant. Recognizing that this could have
been because the events described clear and intentional moral
violations, whereas motivated reasoning is most pronounced in
situations where plausibility constraints are loose and ambiguous,
in Study 7b we used the same design but with events that were
more morally ambiguous (staying silent about disruption at a
protest; not retracting a magazine expose based on an unreliable
source). Confirming predictions, we found that participants attributed different levels of free will for the same action depending on
whether the actor shared or disagreed with their own political
stance. To confirm our results, in Study 7c we conducted a preregistered replication. Surprisingly, our key interaction was not
significant— despite using the same materials, sample recruitment,
participant exclusion rules, and data analysis. Because this could
have been caused by technical problems, two months later we ran

479

a second preregistered replication for Study 7d. With a larger
sample size and an increase in the scale variance from 1–7 to
0 –100, we replicated the significant interaction as predicted,
showing that participants attributed different levels of free will for
the same action depending on whether the target shared or disagreed with their own political stance. Finally, because the effect
sizes for the interaction between ideology and the experimental
manipulation varied across Studies 7a–7d, we concluded with
minimeta-analyses of the interaction effect for these four studies.
These showed small but statistically significant effects of the
interaction between ideology and the experimental manipulation
on free will attributions.
Together, these 14 studies paint a picture whereby conservatives’ comparatively strong free will beliefs are linked to a desire
to hold others accountable for transgressions, and not merely
reflective of a generalized and abstract metaphysical belief concerning the nature of human agency. These results are consistent
with our theory that the relationship between political ideology and
free will beliefs can be at least partially explained as a manifestation of motivated cognition: People endorse the idea of free will
in order to justify their desire to blame others for moral wrongdoing (Clark, Baumeister, et al., 2017; Clark et al., 2014, 2019) with
conservatives reporting higher free will beliefs in part because they
find a wider spectrum of issues to be more morally wrong. Thus,
to understand apparent differences in free will belief we need not
appeal to some special kind of Republican Brain (Mooney, 2012)
that differs from that of liberals on metaphysical beliefs about
human autonomy. Instead where we do see differences in free will
beliefs, they are derived from more basic social– cognitive processes that are shared regardless of the political party one votes for,
and more basic differences in moralization.

Limitations
There are, as with any project, certain limitations to our analysis
here. First, it is important to note that whereas we have focused on
how moralization can help explain the relationship between political ideology and free will beliefs, we do believe that the causal
relationships between our variables of interest (political ideology,
free will beliefs, and moralization) are likely complex and involve
feedback loops. There is already debate in the field as to whether
it makes more sense to conceptualize political orientation as being
caused by, or following from, different moral intuitions. Whereas
some scholars have argued that moralization tendencies and a
broader moral domain can explain why people are attracted to
particular political ideologies (e.g., Graham et al., 2009; Haidt,
2012), others have argued for the opposite casual direction
whereby individual differences associated with ideological beliefs
relating to system justification and social dominance orientation
are what explains differences in the moral domain (e.g., Hatemi,
Crabtree, & Smith, 2019; Kugler, Jost, & Noorbaloochi, 2014;
K. B. Smith, Alford, Hibbing, Martin, & Hatemi, 2017). Similarly,
we have treated political ideology as a predictor variable and free
will attributions as an outcome variable, but differences in perceived freedom likely lead to particular ideological views as well.
We have little doubt that all three of our variables influence and
reinforce one another. What we aimed to test here is whether
experimentally manipulating differences in blame desires between
ideological groups can generate (or eliminate) differences in free
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will attributions. We found consistent support for this, and thus, we
think that this causal pattern does exist, but it does not preclude
other causal patterns from also existing. It is possible that conservatives have proclivities for free will beliefs above and beyond
moralization tendencies, and an individual’s moralizing could lead
to a more conservative ideology that further exaggerates their
moralizing-related affinity for free-will beliefs. Investigating the
possible feedback loops will be an interesting direction for future
research. That said, we do believe that the model we have focused
on here (political orientation predicts free will attributions partially
through increased moralization) is likely to be a particularly promising approach. Whereas there is a large body of evidence showing
substantial stability and consistency in ideological beliefs (e.g.,
Jost, 2006; Jost et al., 2008), along with significant heritability
(Hatemi et al., 2014) and distinct neurocognitive correlates (Amodio et al., 2007), we are aware of no such evidence establishing the
stability, consistency, and heritability of free will beliefs. Indeed,
our own results here show that while conservatives are consistently
likely to report a higher abstract belief in free will, their specific
attributions of free will are deeply context-dependent and susceptible to motivated cognition.
Second, there is room for debate about how precisely free will
attributions should be conceptualized, and especially whether participants’ ratings of responsibility should be included in our measure of overall free will attributions. In line with previous empirical work in this area, we have used the term free will to refer to
an autonomous choice of action that a person performs in the
absence of substantial internal and external constraints (Baumeister & Monroe, 2014; Paulhus & Carey, 2011), where this ability to
choose renders one morally responsible for their actions (Nichols,
2007; Nichols & Knobe, 2007). In short, scholars and laypeople
alike appear concerned with free will primarily because they are
concerned with responsibility. Furthermore, we are interested in
motivated attributions of free will precisely because attributions of
free will create a sense of responsibility, which is relevant to many
political disagreements along both economic and social dimensions. It is for these reasons that our preregistered composite
measure of free will attributions included a question about how
responsible participants judged the actor to be, in addition to
questions about the actor’s control, free will, and ability to choose
otherwise. For scholars who would restrict conceptions of free will
to those related to choice, control, and freedom (and not responsibility), we cross-checked our main results without the responsibility item and this did not impact the statistical significance of any
of our main results. Thus, the pattern of results here applies to the
lay conception of free will regardless of whether that includes
responsibility or not.
Third, our analysis here examines how manipulating desires to
blame increases or decreases ideological differences in tendencies
to attribute free will to individual actors, yet they are only suggestive of potential influences on persistent individual differences
in free will beliefs. We provided evidence that (a) conservatism is
associated with higher beliefs in free will, (b) conservatism is
associated with moralizing, and (c) increasing desires to blame
increases attributions of free will to individual actors. It is theoretically and empirically plausible that conservatives, experiencing
stronger blame desires in their everyday life, might come to
believe more in free will for this reason, but the present work
cannot confirm this definitively. We hope the present results might

inspire future work to seek ways of exploring the causes of
persistent individual differences among liberals and conservatives
in their free will beliefs, and particularly to explore the impact of
persistent desires to blame.
Fourth, our research here involved attributions of free will for
hypothetical (albeit realistic) and not actual events. This was a
deliberate decision to allow us to cleanly manipulate perceived
moral wrongness and control for the information that participants
received. Though we judged this as preferable to studying current
real-world situations in which participants have different levels of
knowledge and investment, it could be interesting for future work
to consider the relationship between political ideology, moralization, and attributions of free will in real-world contexts.
Finally, it should be noted that our experimental research (Studies 3–7) has focused on data from U.S. participants via MTurk. A
key strength of MTurk is that it yields data that are more representative than those from traditional student samples— especially
on the dimensions of age and political ideology (Buhrmester,
Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). However, the fact remains that our
samples typically remain more Western, Educated, Industrialized,
Rich, and Democratic (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010) than
most of the world. For this reason, it would be interesting for
future cross-cultural work to consider the relationship between
political ideology, moralization, and free will in different cultures.

Implications and Directions for Future Research
The findings reported in this article have theoretical implications for both the psychology of free will belief and political
psychology. First, these findings provide further and more direct
support for previous work conducted on free will belief as motivated social cognition (Clark, Baumeister, et al., 2017; Clark et al.,
2014, 2018; Clark, Winegard, & Baumeister, 2019; Vonasch,
Clark, Lau, Vohs, & Baumeister, 2017). The work reported here
demonstrates that belief in free will is linked to a desire to hold
people accountable for their moral wrongdoing, and that free will
attributions vary as a function of the valence of the action, how
moral or immoral it is perceived to be, and even who the target is.
Pragmatically, this highlights the fact that when exploring free will
attributions, it is essential to consider—and control for—the valence and perceived morality of the event. Second, these findings
provide further support for the idea that attributions of free will are
malleable and context-dependent, not stable across situations and
context (Bargh & Earp, 2009). Third, these results help to shed
light on the pervasive political discourse concerning responsibility
and assignment of blame. The findings suggest that the emphasis
within conservative political ideology on personal responsibility is
directly linked to perceptions of immorality. For example, as
illegal drug use is perceived to be more morally wrong, so too are
drug users seen as more responsible and in control of their situation; and as being unemployed and receiving social welfare is seen
to be more morally wrong, so too are people in such situations seen
as being more responsible for and in control of their lot. The reason
that political debates concerning responsibility and deservingness
have been an enduring feature of political discourse throughout
history is likely to stem, at least in part, from the powerful and
often conflicting moral intuitions driving such judgments.
Following from this view, our findings have interesting theoretical and practical implications concerning the structure of policies
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related to behaviors that conservatives and liberals perceive as
being differentially blameworthy. Consider, for example, attitudes
toward unemployment benefits. The results presented here suggest
that conservative policies opposing greater benefit payments are
likely to be linked to the perception that hard work is a moral
principle—and that not working is, therefore, blameworthy. Indeed, such an analysis is consistent with statements from prominent conservative leaders such as Margaret Thatcher (1981), who
described her policies as “based not on some economics theory,
but on things I and millions like me were brought up with [such as]
an honest day’s work for an honest day’s pay.” Political policies,
it seems, are intimately tied to perceptions of morality of the
actions concerned. This may help account for the seeming intractability of political conflict over economic policy: it is likely easier
to reconcile deliberative, fact-based disagreement about the specific outcomes of policies, than it is to reconcile affect-based
intuitions about moral responsibility. Put simply, while disagreement about economic outcomes can be resolved with better data, it
is difficult to see an easy way to reconcile disagreements about
who is morally responsible, and for what. We have no illusions
that this will be easy, but our findings do suggest that political
consensus on hot-topic issues such as welfare and benefits, when
it can be reached, is likely to occur not through extended discussion of the economic features of the policies, but rather in achieving common moral ground.
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